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Abstract—Smart contracts are self-executed programs that run on a blockchain. They cannot be modified once deployed and hence
they bring unique maintenance challenges compared to conventional software. This study focuses on the key novel maintenance
issues related to smart contracts on Ethereum, and aims to answer (i) What kinds of issues will smart contract developers encounter for
corrective, adaptive, perfective, and preventive maintenance? (ii) What are the current maintenance methods used for smart contracts?
and (iii) What should we do in the future to increase the maintainability of smart contracts? To obtain the answers to these research
questions, we first conducted a systematic literature review to analyze 131 smart contract related research papers published from 2014
to 2020. Since the Ethereum ecosystem is fast-growing some results from previous publications might be out-of-date and there may be
a practice gap between academia and industry. To address this we performed an online survey of smart contract developers on Github
to validate our findings and we received 165 useful responses. Based on the survey feedback and literature review, we present the first
empirical study on smart contract maintenance. Our study can help smart contract developers better maintain their smart
contract-based projects, and we highlight some key future research directions to improve the Ethereum ecosystem.
Index Terms—Empirical Study, Literature Review, Smart Contracts, Ethereum, Software Maintenance
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the great success of Bitcoin [1], considerable attention has
been paid to the emerging concepts of blockchain technology [2].
However, the usage scenario of Bitcoin is limited, as the main
applications of Bitcoin is storing and transferring values [3].
The appearance of Ethereum [4] at the end of 2015 changed
the limitation of blockchain-based systems. Ethereum leverages
a technology named smart contracts, which are Turing-complete
programs that run on the blockchain. The blockchain technology
gives immutable, self-executed, and decentralized features to the
smart contract, which means smart contracts cannot be modified
once deployed to the blockchain, even by the creators of the
contracts. These features ensure the trustworthiness of smart
contracts and make this technology attractive to developers. By
utilizing smart contracts, developers can easily develop Decentral-
ized Applications (DApps) [5]. By Apr. 2020, millions of smart
contracts have been applied to different areas, such as IoT [6],
financial [7], gaming [8], and data security [9].
However, the revolutionary features of Ethereum also make
smart contracts much harder to maintain than conventional pro-
grams [10]. Due to their immutability, it is not easy to upgrade
a deployed smart contract when bugs are detected. Ethereum is a
permission-less network and sensitive information, e.g., transac-
tions, bytecode, balance of smart contracts are visible to everyone,
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and everyone can call the contract by sending transactions. These
features increase possible security threats and counter-actions
needed. Moreover, unlike traditional programs that usually run
on a local machine or server, all transactions for smart contracts
are executed by “miners” - the highly distributed ledger nodes
of the blockchain platform. The presence of misbehaving miners
can lead to several security issues, e.g, Block Info Dependency,
Selfish Mining, which also increases the difficulty of smart contract
maintenance. Finally, smart contracts on Ethereum have several
other unique characteristics – the use of the “gas” system to
fund running of transactions; the “self-destruct” construct that
smart contracts can run; non-determinism of the ordering of
smart contract transaction execution decided by individual miners;
relatively few patterns and standards for structuring smart contract
code; lack of multi-threaded execution; very different exception
handling mechanisms; lack of source code available for most
deployed smart contracts; and relative lack of pre- and post-
deployment tools to check smart contracts for errors, compared
to conventional software.
The term software maintenance refers to the modification of
a software product after delivery to correct faults and to improve
performance or other attributes [11]. It is a very broad activity, and
there are four main kinds of maintenance according to ISO/IEC
14764 [12], i.e., adaptive, perfective, corrective, and preventive
maintenance. All four maintenance activities are important for
smart contracts. Adaptive maintenance aims to keep a software
usable in a changed or changing environment. However, the
running environment of smart contract is unpredictable, as the
execution of smart contracts depends miners, and some miners
misbehave and attack the contracts to make profit. The unpre-
dictable environment makes it very difficult to conduct adaptive
maintenance for smart contracts. Perfective maintenance is used
to improve the performance or maintainability by adding new re-
quirements and functionalities newly elicited from users. However,
the scalability issues and the gas system of Ethereum make smart
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2contracts hard to add functionalities. Corrective maintenance
focuses on fixing discovered bugs and errors in a program. The
lack of tools and community support make it hard to detect and
remove smart contract bugs. Preventive maintenance aims to
remove latent faults of programs before they become operational
faults. For example, a code smell is any characteristic in the source
code that possibly indicates a deeper problem [13]. Refactoring
the code to remove code smells [13] in a software to increase its
robustness is a typical preventive maintenance method. However,
due to the immature ecosystem of smart contracts, it is not
easy to find appropriate advanced methods to conduct preventive
maintenance for smart contracts.
Maintenance for smart contracts is also different from the
traditional software maintenance, as smart contracts cannot be
modified once deployed. Unlike traditional programs that can be
upgraded directly, to maintain a smart contract developers need to
redeploy a smart contract and discard the old version. Moreover,
some kinds of maintenance overlap with development activities.
Specifically, in perfective maintenance, developers also need to
develop some functionalities to satisfy the new requirements
from the users. In all kinds of maintenance, developers need to
ensure the security of the upgraded version before deploying it
to Ethereum. Thus, some development challenges, e.g., security
issues, scalability issues, will also be challenges in smart contract
maintenance.
In this paper, we conduct the first empirical study focus-
ing exclusively on the maintenance issues of smart contracts
on Ethereum, the most popular smart contract platform. Many
previous works [10], [14]–[17] conduct empirical studies to in-
vestigate the challenges of smart contract development or focus
on the security issues of smart contracts. However, none focus
exclusively on the maintenance of smart contracts, which is a
critical software engineering process. To fill this gap, we provide
a comprehensive empirical study on smart contract maintenance
based on a systematic literature review that covers 131 smart
contract related papers selected from a collection of 946 papers
to find maintenance challenges, methods and future directions for
smart contracts. Since the Ethereum ecosystem is fast growing
this might lead some findings of prior works being outdated. For
example, He et al. [18] and Luu et al. [19] mentioned that swarm
hash code always begins with 0xa165. Removing swarm hash code
is an important step when developing smart contract bytecode
analysis tools. However, with the publishing of Solidity v5.0 [20],
different kinds of Solidity compilers refer to different start signals
of swarm hash codes. Also, there might be gaps between academia
and industry practice. For instance, some tools newly proposed by
academia are not known or used widely by industry. To ensure
the correctness of our findings, we use an online survey to collect
practicing smart contract developers’ feedbacks. Our study aims
to answer the following key research questions:
RQ1: What kinds of maintenance issues will smart con-
tract developers encounter? We identify 10 issues related to
corrective, adaptive, perfective, and preventive maintenance, and
another 5 issues corresponding to the overall maintenance process.
The maintenance issues are found from previous publications.
Since Ethereum and smart contracts are fast-evolving, some results
from previous works might be outdated. There might be a gap
between academia and industry. To make our results more reliable,
we use an online survey to validate our findings. We sent the
survey to 1,500 smart contract developers on Github, and received
165 useful responses. The feedback from the survey can also be
a supplement to our findings. We analyze the reasons for smart
contract maintenance issues according to the survey results.
RQ2: What are the current maintenance methods for
smart contracts? To help developers maintain smart contracts,
we summarize four kinds of current maintenance methods from 41
publications. 31 publications introduce offline checking methods
to help developers maintain smart contracts. This kind of method
usually detects the security issues of smart contract. Thus, it can
only help maintain smart contracts before they are deployed to
Ethereum. Seven publications introduced online checking meth-
ods, which can help maintain deployed smart contracts by detect-
ing malicious input or automatically upgrading smart contracts.
Two previous works suggested developers to use the Selfdestruct
function to undo contracts when emergencies happen. Another
work describes how smart contract can be upgraded by using
DELEGATECALL instruction.
RQ3: What should we do in the future? According to the
findings from our previous research questions and survey results,
we give four suggestions for both developers and researchers to
help improve the ecosystem of Ethereum, and four suggestions to
help improve Ethereum’s Solidity smart contract language.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first in-depth
empirical study that focuses on the maintenance issues of
smart contracts on Ethereum.
• Our study identifies the key current maintenance methods
used for smart contracts, which gives guidance for smart
contract developers to better maintain their contracts.
• Our study highlights the limitations and possible future work
related to smart contracts on Ethereum. This gives directions
for smart contract developers and researchers to develop
improved tools and conduct future research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we provide background knowledge of smart contracts and
Ethereum. In Section 3, we introduce the methodology to conduct
the literature reviews and the survey. After that, we present the
answers to the three research questions in Sections 4-6, respec-
tively. We discuss key threats to validity in Section 7 and review
related work in Section 8. Finally, we conclude the whole study
and summarise future work in Section 9.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Ethereum
In 2008, the first blockchain-based cryptocurrency named Bit-
coin was introduced and demonstrated the enormous potential
of blockchain to the world. However, the biggest limitation of
Bitcoin is that it only allows users to encode non-Turing-complete
scripts to process transactions, which greatly limits its capability.
To address this limitation, Ethereum was invented by Vitalik et al.
at the end of 2015 and introduced a technology named Smart
Contracts to the world. Nowadays, Ethereum has become the
second most popular blockchain system and the most popular
platform on which to run smart contracts [21], [22]. Similar to
Bitcoin, Ethereum also provides its cryptocurrency and names it
as Ether. In Jan. 2018, Ether reached its highest value to $1389
/ Ether [23]. Unlike Bitcoin, which has a fixed number of coins
(21 million in total), 18 million Ethers are created every year [24]
(and 72 million Ether were generated at its launch). Five new
Ethers are created with each block, and it requires about 14-15s
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Fig. 1: An Example of Hard Fork and Soft Fork. The blue block
called divergence block, where the blockchain system updates
its protocol. The new protocol for hard fork is not backward-
compatible, while soft fork is backward-compatible.
to create a new block. Currently, the average Ethereum block size
is between 20 to 30 KB, and the biggest Ethereum block size is
around 2MB [25]. Ethereum does not support concurrency, and
all transactions need to be executed by all nodes, which leads
to a low throughput of Ethereum. Ethereum only allows about
15 transactions per second, which has become one of its biggest
limitations. At the end of 2017, there is a famous smart-contract-
based game named CryptoKitties [8] published in the Ethereum.
However, the popularity of the game slowed down all transactions
as too many players sent transactions to the Ethereum blockchain.
2.2 Hard Fork and Soft Fork
Any software or operating system needs periodic upgrades to fix
errors or add new functionalities. For the blockchain system, those
updates are called a “fork”. There are two kinds of forks, i.e., hard
fork and soft fork.
Figure 1 shows an example of a hard fork and soft fork. The
blockchain system is a decentralized network. All the nodes on the
network need to follow the same rules. The set of rules is known
as the protocol. In Figure 1, the blue block is called a divergence
block, where the blockchain system updates its protocol.
Hard Fork. When a protocol is updated, and the new protocol is
not backwards-compatible. Some nodes on the blockchain do not
accept the new protocol, and they choose to use the old version.
Thus, the blockchain forks into 2 incompatible blockchains, which
run the new and old protocol, respectively.
Soft Fork. Some updates of protocols are backwards-compatible.
For example, in the old protocol, the block size is 3MB, and the
new protocol limits the block size to 2MB. The old protocol can
still process transactions and push new blocks that are 2MB or
less. However, if an old node tries to push a block that is greater
than 2MB, the new nodes will reject to broadcast the block, which
encourages the old nodes to update to the new protocols.
2.3 Smart Contracts
Smart contracts can be regarded as Turning-complete programs
that run on the blockchain. They are usually developed in a high-
level language, e.g., Solidity, Vyper [26]. Solidity is the most pop-
ular programming language with which to develop smart contracts
on Ethereum. Based on the immutable blockchain technology
concept, smart contracts cannot be modified once added to the
blockchain. Once started, all running of the contract is based on its
code. No one can affect it, even the creator. Ethereum uses EVM
(Ethereum Virtual Machine) to execute smart contracts. When
developers deploy a smart contract to Ethereum, EVM compiles
the contract to EVM bytecode and stores the bytecode on the
blockchain forever. The only way to remove the bytecode from
Ethereum is by using the Selfdestruct function [20]. There is a
unique 40 bytes hexadecimal hash value to identify a contract
address. Since Ethereum is a permission-less network. Everyone
can send a transaction to the contract address to execute the
contract through contract ABI (Application Binary Interface) [20].
Even worse, all the transactions, bytecode, invocation parameters
are visible to everyone, which makes smart contracts face major
security challenges.
2.4 The Gas System
Execution and storage are expensive in blockchain systems. To
manage this, Ethereum uses the “gas” system to ensure the
execution of smart contracts can be eventually terminated. In
Ethereum, transactions are executed by miners, and transaction
senders need to pay an amount of Ether to the miner, which is
so-called the gas mechanism. For each transaction, the EVM will
calculate its gas cost, and the transaction sender is required to
define a gas price, e.g., 20 Gwei / gas unit (1Ether = 19Gwei).
The final transaction fee is calculated by gas cost× gas price.
Miners have the right to decide the transaction execution order.
Thus, higher gas prices can lead to faster execution and vice versa.
According to the ETH Gas Station [27], in May 2020, if the gas
price is higher than 40 Gwei, the transaction can be executed with
2 minutes. If the gas price is lower than 25 Gwei, the execution
time can exceed half an hour.
The contract creator is required to set a gas limit, which refers
to the maximum gas cost of a transaction. If the gas cost of a
transaction exceeds the gas limit, the execution will be terminated
with an exception throw by EVM named out-of-gas error. The
gas system ensures the normal running of the Ethereum. However,
it also increases the difficulty of smart contract development, as
developers should estimate the maximum gas cost of the contracts,
especially in some special cases. Once the contract has been
deployed, the gas limit cannot ever be changed.
2.5 Upgradeable Smart Contracts
Even though smart contracts cannot be changed once deployed to
the blockchain, there is a method to develop upgradeable contracts.
Ethereum provides a function named DelegateCall, which allows
a contract to use code in other contracts, and all storage changes
are made in the caller’s value. In this case, developers can develop
two contracts, A and B. A is the proxy contract, which controls
all the storage values, contract states, and Ethers. All the logic
code is stored in contract B. Once errors are found, or new
functionalities need to be added, contract B can be discarded, and
contract A can call the code of the new contract. Based on this
theory, OpenZeppelin, a famous smart contract organization, has
provided a library [28] to help developers develop upgradeable
smart contracts in just a few lines.
42.6 Software Maintenance
Software maintenance is an important and inevitable part of
the software development life cycle, which can lead to 60% of
software cost [29]. The purpose is to correct faults and update
software to improve its performance and functionality after de-
livery [11]. Software maintenance is a very broad activity, and
the ISO/IEC 14764 [12] identified four categories of maintenance,
i.e., corrective, adaptive, perfective, and preventive maintenance.
All the four maintenance activities are important to enlarge the life
cycle of programs. The detailed definition of them are:
• Corrective maintenance: Modification of software after
delivery to correct discovered bugs / errors.
• Adaptive maintenance: Modification of software after de-
livery to keep a software product usable in a changed or
changing environment.
• Perfective maintenance: Modification of software after de-
livery to improve performance ormaintainability.
• Preventive maintenance: Modification of software after
delivery to detect and correct latent faults in the software
product before they become effective faults.
2.7 Difficulties for Smart Contracts Maintenance
Maintenance of Ethereum smart contracts is different and more
challenging compared to traditional software maintenance.
Corrective Maintenance. It is not easy to remove a post-
deployment discovered bug by upgrading a smart contract because
of its immutability. Although developers can develop upgradeable
contracts by using DelegateCall1 [20], or destroying the buggy
contracts by using Selfdestruct2 function [45], both these two
methods can increase security risks, trust of smart contract users,
and development costs (detailed see Section 4.1.1). Related code
snippets also need to be hard-coded in the smart contract before
deployed to the blockchain. Otherwise, developers can only dis-
card the old contracts and deploy a new one. However, it can lead
to huge financial loss when attacks happen.
Adaptive Maintenance. The environment for smart contracts is
unpredictable, which makes it hard for developers to conduct
adaptive maintenance to keep smart contracts usable in changing
or changed blockchain environment. First, all the execution of
smart contracts depend on the distributed ledger nodes, or the
“miners”. However, some miners may misbehave and attack
the contracts to make themselves a profit. Ethereum might also
undergo an unplanned hard fork to deal with some emergent
new attacks, such as the “DAO hard fork [30]”, “EIP-150 Hard
Fork” [31] and “Spurious Dragon” [32]. Such a unplanned hard
fork might lead to the change of the running environment, e.g.,
the gas cost, which could lead to errors. Moreover, smart contracts
can call other contracts, while the state of the callee contracts
also might be unpredictable. For example, the state of callee
contracts can be changed by other contracts or be destructed
by calling the Selfdestruct functions. All of the miners, hard
forks, callee contracts can lead to the change of smart contract
running environment. It is inherently difficult to conduct adaptive
1. DelegateCall allows a contract calls the code in callee, and the storage
changes are made in the caller’s value, and nothing is reflected in callee’s
storage.
2. Selfdestruct function is the only way to remove the contract from
Ethereum. When executing this method, the caller can transfer all Ethers of
the balance to a specific address.
TABLE 1: Initial Number of Smart Contract Related Research
Papers Returned by Each Search Engine
Search Engine Papers
ACM Digital Library 73
IEEE Xplore Digital Library 177
Springer Online Library 54
Elsevier Science Direct 11
Google Scholar 631
Total 946
maintenance to make contracts usable in such an unpredictable
environment.
Perfective Maintenance. The scalability issues of Ethereum and
Solidity make smart contracts hard to scale i.e. to add many
functionalities to a smart contract or set of smart contracts DApp.
For example, EVM does not support multi-threaded execution, and
Ethereum only supports 15 transactions per second. The grammar
of Solidity is also very simple, which increases the difficulty of
developing large scale projects. Besides, the gas system is hard to
handle with an increase of project scale.
Preventive Maintenance. Preventive maintenance is usually
guided by advanced software engineering methods, e.g., code
smell removal [33], bug prediction [34], self-admitted technical
debt determination [35]. However, the immature ecosystem for
smart contracts makes it hard for developers to find related
methods to conduct preventive maintenance. In addition, the lack
of high quality reference code and standards also increases the
difficulty for preventive maintenance.
3 METHODOLOGY
Figure 2 shows the overview of our methodology, which contains
two phases, i.e., literature review and survey. In phase 1, we
perform a systematic literature review, which aims to find the
answers to research questions from prior smart contract related
papers. After obtaining the answers, we use an online survey to
validate whether smart contract developers agree with our findings.
In the following subsections, we present the detailed steps of our
literature review and survey.
3.1 Literature Review
In this paper, we follow the method provided by Kitchenham et
al. [36] to perform the literature review. There are three steps
in phase 1, i.e., literature search, literature selection, and data
analysis.
3.1.1 Literature Search
Guided by prior literature reviews [37]–[39], we select five search
engines, i.e., ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore Digital Library,
Springer Online Library, Elsevier Science Direct, and Google
Scholar. From these search engines, we can find peer reviewed
research papers published in journals, conferences, workshops,
and symposia.
We used keyword search to obtain 946 initial smart contract
related papers. The detailed numbers of the research papers
returned by different search engines are shown in Table 1. (The
duplicated papers are removed.) All of these 946 research papers
contain at least one of the keywords “smart contracts” , “smart
contract”, “Ethereum” in their title. Since there are many other
blockchain platforms supporting smart contracts, and our focus
is Ethereum, all the selected papers should contain the keyword
”Ethereum” in their abstract.
5Phase 1: Literature Review
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Search
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Data Source:
ACM Digital Library
IEEE Xplore Digital Library
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Industry Partners
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Fig. 2: Overview of methodology design
3.1.2 Literature Selection
Although all the papers that we find in our literature search contain
the keywords “smart contract” and “Ethereum” in their abstract,
some of them are still irrelevant to our study. For example, some
research related to other smart contract platforms might also
contain the keyword “Ethereum” in their abstracts. We applied
the following five exclusion criteria to remove irrelevant papers:
Exclusion Criteria
(1) Studies are not written in English.
(2) Master or Ph.D. theses.
(3) Keynote papers.
(4) Studies not related to Ethereum.
(5) Studies not related to smart contracts.
In this study we only focus on smart contract maintenance
issues. Thus, research based on underlying blockchain technology,
e.g., consensus algorithms, are excluded. We only focus on the
following topics:
Inclusion Topics
(1) Smart contract empirical studies.
(2) Smart contract applications, e.g, smart contract for IoT.
(3) Smart contract security / reliability Analysis.
(4) Smart contract standards.
(5) Smart contract optimization, e.g., gas optimization.
(6) Other smart contract technologies, e.g, smart contract
generation, decompilers.
To reduce errors, we conducted close card sorting [40] to
check the collected data. Card sorting is a common method used
to evaluate and derive categories from the data [41]. There are
three types of card sort, i.e., open card sort, closed card sort, and
hybrid card sorting. Among these three kinds of card sort, closed
card sort has predefined categories. We apply closed card sort to
select relevant papers, as there only two categories, e.g., relevant or
irrelevant. For each card, it has a title (the name of the paper) and
description (abstract of the papers). Two experienced researchers
(including a non-coauthor) carefully read the abstract of the initial
946 research papers independently, and then compare their results
after finishing the reading. If there are some differences, they
discussed to decide the whether the papers should be excluded.
Finally, 112 relevant papers are selected from initial 946 papers.
After that, we followed the prior study [39] approach to conduct
a snowballing step to enlarge the paper list. We manually checked
the references of the identified 112 papers and from these found
another 19 papers that satisfy our selection criteria. Thus, we
finally selected 131 papers for analysis. The paper list can be
found at: https://github.com/Jiachi-Chen/Maintenance
3.1.3 Data Analysis
The Ethereum proposal was presented in late 2013, and the system
went live at the end of 2015. All the 131 selected papers were
published between 2014 to 2020, and they were carefully read. The
answers to the three RQs shown in Table 2 were collected during
the paper reading. Considering our study aims to find answers
with categories being unknown in advance (different kinds of
maintenance issues, methods, future directions), we decided to
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Fig. 3: The number of papers published between 2014 to 2020.
TABLE 2: Data Collection for Each RQ.
RQs Type of Data We Collected
RQ1 What are the challenges / issues of smart contract maintenance? The data is
classified by corrective, adaptive, perfective, and preventive maintenance.
RQ2 What are the used maintenance methods? e.g., off-line / on-line security
checking methods, other methods.
RQ3 What are the suggestions to improve the ecosystem of smart contracts?
adopt an open card sorting approach to help find the answers of
these three RQs.
Each card has a title (the name of the paper) and description
(paper content). The same two researchers (including one non-
coauthor) read all the papers independently and collected the data
from the papers. The detailed data are shown in Table 2. The
cards were then clustered into a low-level group according to
the collected data. Each group has a detailed topic or theme, e.g,
gas issues, miner behaviors. Some cards were omitted during the
card sort, as they are not related to smart contract maintenance.
The low level groups were then clustered into high-level groups,
which allows us to obtain a hierarchical structure of the categories.
For example, the highest level has three categories, which are
the answers to three research questions. The substructure of RQ1
(second highest level), it has five categories, i.e., common, correc-
tive, adaptive, perfective, and preventive maintenance issues. The
lowest level is the detailed maintenance issues of each category.
3.2 Survey
3.2.1 Survey Design
Our smart contract developer survey contains three parts, i.e.,
demographic questions, smart contract maintenance related ques-
tions, and suggestion related questions. We follow the previous
smart contract related work [42] to design the following five
demographic questions in our survey. Since our survey is based
on Google Form, and Google cannot be accessed in China, we
also designed a Chinese version to receive responses from Chinese
developers. The translated version was double-checked to ensure
consistence with the English version.
Demographics:
• Professional smart contract developer? : Yes / No
• Involved in open source software development? : Smart
Contract Projects only / Traditional Projects Only / Both /
None
• Main role in developing smart contract.
• Experience in years
• Current country of residence
These questions aim to understand the background and ex-
perience of the respondents, which allows us to remove some
feedback that we wish to exclude, e.g., feedback provided by very
inexperienced respondents.
In the second part of the survey, we designed 15 questions to
help provide answers to the same three research questions that we
TABLE 3: List of questions included in the survey.
ID Question
Q1 How do you obtain your required knowledge about smart contracts?
Q2 Do you believe smart contracts have higher security requirements than
traditional, centralized apps, e.g., mobile apps, web apps?
Q3 How do you test / debug your smart contracts for security and scalability?
Q4 How do you maintain your deployed smart contracts?
Q5-6 Have you developed an upgradeable smart contract before? If not, why?
Q7 Do you believe smart contracts are harder to maintain than traditional
centralized apps, e.g., mobile apps, web apps? Why?
Q8 What maintenance issues do your smart contracts have?
Q9 Which features / limitations of Ethereum can increase the difficulty of
maintenance?
Q10 Are you satisfied with the current ecosystem for smart contracts, e.g.,
platforms for sharing data?
Q11 Have you ever used the code of smart contracts from the following
platforms, e.g., Github, Stack Overflow, Etherscan?
Q12 Give a score for IDE, testing tools, security audit tools, smart contract
explorer, Q&A site, Comments from Public (Github, DApp Store), com-
munity support, Solidity and Ethereum document, respectively.
Q13 Do you think smart contracts are suitable for developing a large scale
project?
Q14 Do you think it is necessary to have an app store like IOS Store for smart
contracts?
Q15 Currently, there are many technologies that can improve the security of
smart contracts. Do you think it is important to merge them into EVM /
Ethereum / IDE?
found from the literature survey. The details of the survey can be
found at: https://github.com/Jiachi-Chen/Maintenance. The list of
the questions included in our survey can found in Table 3. For
questions 1, 3-6, 8-9, 11, we give the participants several choices
that are obtained by literature review. Besides, for these questions,
we give a textbox to allow participants to write comments. For
questions 10 and 12, we follow the previous survey [42] to give
five scores to participants from score 1 (lowest) to score 5 (height),
and score 3 refers to “neutral”.
In the third part of the survey, we give a text box to respondents
to allow them to give us final comments or questions.
3.2.2 Survey Validation
Guided by Kitchenham et al. [43], we utilized an anonymous
survey [44] to collect personal opinions. To increase response
rates, we offered a raffle to respondents so that they can choose to
leave an email to take part in the raffle to win two $50 Amazon gift
cards. We first sent our survey to our research partners to conduct
a small scale test to refine the survey. They were asked to tell us
(1) Whether the expressions used in the survey is clear and easy
to understand, (2) How many minutes were needed to complete
the whole survey. Finally, we modified our survey based on their
feedback and limited the time of filling the survey to under 15
minutes.
3.2.3 Recruitment of Respondents
The ideal respondents of our survey are smart contract devel-
opers. We aimed to send our survey to Github developers who
contributed to smart contract related projects. We first searched
for projects on Github by using keywords “Smart Contract”,
“Ethereum”, “Blockchain”, and ranked the projects by the most
stars. Then, to increase the response rate and exclude non-smart-
contract developers, we manually selected relevant projects by
reading the descriptions of the projects. After that, we crawled
the emails and names of contributors of the selected projects by
using Github Developer API3. We finally obtained 1,500 emails
of developers and sent an email to invite them to participate in
3. https://developer.github.com/v3/
7our survey. We also have some industry partners working in well-
known companies, e.g, Alibaba, Facebook, and sent our survey to
them.
3.2.4 Data Analysis
We received a total of 178 valid responses from 32 different
countries4 (The response rate is about 11.87%), which is a
good response number and rate compared to previous smart
contract related surveys [10], [14], [16], [42], [45]. Among these
178 respondents, 13 of them claim that they do not have any
experience in smart contract development. Thus, we removed
them from our dataset and used the remaining 165 for further
analysis. 103 (62.42) respondents claim that they are involved in
both open-source smart contract projects and traditional projects.
23 (13.94%) respondents only have experience in open source
smart contract development efforts. The top three countries in
which respondents reside are China (35.76%), USA (15.15%)
and UK (9.09%). The average years of experience in developing
smart contracts of our respondents are 2.31 years. Among these
respondents, 106 (64.24%) of them claim their main role is
development, 42 (25.45%) indicate testing, 29 (17.58%) indicate
project management, 6 (3.64%) indicate risk analysis, 4 (2.42%)
indicate research. (Some respondents have multiple job roles; thus
the total number exceeds 165.)
4 RQ1: THE MAINTENANCE ISSUES OF SMART
CONTRACTS
There are four broad kinds of maintenance, i.e., corrective, adap-
tive, perfective, and preventive maintenance. In this section, we
identify the key maintenance issues for smart contracts consider-
ing four aspects. We also introduce some common maintenance
issues (CMI), which appear in all kinds of maintenance. All the
findings are obtained by literature reviews (the source are cited),
and we give survey results to cross-validate each finding. It should
be noted that software maintenance is a very broad activity. Some
kind of maintenance, e.g., perfective maintenance also requires
developers to develop new functionalities as well as change old.
Thus, some of the challenges we discuss can be encountered in
both smart contract development and maintenance phases.
4.1 Common Maintenance Issues
4.1.1 No Perfect Modification Methods
Immutability is an important feature of smart contracts, which
makes smart contracts distinct from traditional apps. However,
this feature also leads to difficulty of their modification.
According to our survey, we received four kinds of answers 5
for the question “How to maintain the deployed contracts” (Q4 in
Table 3). The four answers are:
• I never maintained a contract (18.79%)
• I discard the old contract directly and deploy a new one
(39.39%)
• I use Selfdestruct function to destroy the old contract and
deploy a new one (38.79%)
• I develop upgradeable contracts. (35.76%).
However, all of these four answers are imperfect and can lead
to high financial loss in some situations.
4. ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL
5. The questions are multi-choice. Thus the sum of each options can exceed
100%. The same with the other questions.
For answer (1), this method is very inadvisable as some bugs
are inevitable [46]. Without maintenance, the useful life of the
programs will be much shortened and attackers can freely attack
the contracts.
For answer (2), this method can lead to enormous financial loss
for the contract owners, as the Ethers cannot be transferred unless
a specific code include in the contract. The DAO attack [30] is
an example of this. it made the DAO (Decentralized Autonomous
Organization) lose 3.6 million Ethers. In 2016, an attacker found
a bug named reentrancy [47], [48] in the DAO contract. Since the
DAO contract did not contain a Selfdestruct function and did not
develop as an upgradeable contract, there was no way to modify
the contract and this lead to an enormous financial loss for the
organization.
For answer (3), adding a Selfdestruct function can reduce
the financial loss when emergencies happen. Using the DAO
attack as an example, the DAO organization could have used
this function to destruct the contract and transfer all the Ethers
when the attack was detected. After fixing the bugs, they can
deploy a new contract, and transfer the Ethers to the new contract.
However, this method is still harmful to both contract owners
and users in some situations. Our previous work [45] investigated
the reasons why developers do not add Selfdestruct functions in
their contracts. Developer feedback showed the following reasons.
First, adding a Selfdestruct function also opens an attack vector
to the attackers. Thus, developers need to pay more effort to
test smart contract security and permissions. The testing can add
additional complexity to the development, which can increase the
development cost. Second, adding a Selfdestruct function can also
lead to a trust concern for the smart contract users. This is because
many users trust Ethereum because of the immutability of smart
contracts. All the execution of the contract depends on its code;
even the owner cannot transfer Ethers on the contract balance.
This feature is important in financial applications as it ensure the
asset safety of contract users. However, the Selfdestruct function
breaks the immutability of the contracts. It gives power to the
contract owners to transfer all the Ethers of the contracts. Thus,
this method can lead to the reduction of the number of users of
the smart contract using it. Finally, the Selfdestruct function can
also lead to a financial loss in some situations, as the Ethers that
were sent to the destructed contract address will be locked forever.
Thus, this method is still not a perfect method to maintain smart
contracts.
For answer (4), still raises the same trust concern similar to
answer (3), as the smart contract immutability features are also
be broken. According to our survey (Q5-6 in Table 3), we found
that only 29.70% of the respondents have developed upgradeable
smart contracts. There are three reasons why developers do not
develop upgradeable contracts. 41.74% of the respondents claim
that they do not know how to develop upgradeable smart contracts.
Thus, to develop upgradeable smart contracts, they need to pay
a learning cost. 32.17% and 33.04% of the respondents said
developing upgradeable contracts can increase the development
cost and security risks. Thus, this method still incurs a high cost
for maintenance.
To summarize, all of these four methods are not perfect and
can lead to the high cost of maintenance.
4.1.2 High Requirement for Security
Unlike traditional programs that can be upgraded directly, devel-
opers need to redeploy a new smart contract to the blockchain.
8Ensuring the security of the contract before redeploying to the
blockchain is important, as each the modification can cost a lot
(see 4.1.1). According to our survey, 129 (78.18%) respondents
believe smart contracts have higher security requirements. 107
(64.85%) respondents said smart contracts are harder to maintain
compared to traditional apps. The reasons introduced below lead
to the high-security requirement of the smart contracts.
1. The immutability Features. All the transactions and the code
of smart contracts are immutable, which means that developers
need to ensure the security of the code and each transaction.
Once any bugs are detected, there is no direct way to patch them.
Attackers can utilize the errors / bugs to steal Ethers or lock the
balance maliciously [49]. Thus, immutability raises a high security
requirement for the smart contracts.
2. Financial Attractiveness. Financial profit is an important mo-
tivation for attackers. According to our survey, about 81 (49.09%)
respondents believe that this is more financially attractive for
attacking smart contracts compared to traditional software, thus
leading to more attack [50]. Since many contracts hold Ethers,
attackers can earn profits through their attacks. Even worse, the
sensitive information of smart contracts are visible to anyone, e.g.,
bytecode, Ethers on the balance. Attackers can launch precision
strikes to the vulnerable contracts. Thus, developers need to pay
more efforts to ensure the security of the smart contracts.
3. Permission-less Network. Smart contracts run on a permission-
less network; everyone can execute the smart contracts by send-
ing a transaction. 92 (55.76%) respondents mentioned that the
permission-less feature could increase the difficulty of the mainte-
nance. They need to pay more effort to test the permission of the
contracts. Previous work [45] introduced a security issue named
Limits of Permissions. Some contracts do not check the permission
of their sensitive functions. Attackers can utilize the vulnerabilities
of the permission check to steal Ethers.
4.1.3 High Requirement for Documentation
Today, it is not enough to be a good programmer, but also to
be a skilled writer [51]. When developers conduct a modification
of functionality, software architecture, or design patterns, the
documentation should be modified accordingly. However, incon-
sistencies between the code and the documentation are likely,
which can result in serious consequences for smart contracts.
In Ethereum, all the outside interactions or contract-to-contract
interactions of smart contracts rely on ABI (Abstract Binary
Interface). Ethereum only stores the bytecode of smart contracts,
which are not human-readable. The inconsistencies between the
code and the documentation might lead to smart contract usage
mistakes.
4.1.4 Low Readability
Readability is important to help developers understand the smart
contracts and maintain their smart contracts [14]. According to
our survey, 147 (89.1%) respondents claim that they use the
source code of other smart contracts from open sourced platforms,
e.g., Etherscan, Github to help author and maintain their smart
contracts. 57.14% of the respondents also said the poor readability
of smart contracts increases the difficulty of the code reuse.
Making smart contracts readable is a challenge, as developers need
to balance the readability with gas consumption. For example,
optimizing code is a common method to reduce gas consumption.
The more gas-efficient code usually corresponds to shorter code.
However, this shorter code can lead to poorer readability.
4.1.5 The Lack of Experienced Developers and Re-
searchers.
Experienced developers and researchers are the main inventors
of new advanced SE methods to address the limitation of smart
contracts, e.g., developing tools, improving ecosystem. However,
our survey results and literature review shows that there are
much less experienced people in Ethereum compared to traditional
development.
Ethereum is a young system, which was published in 2016.
The most experienced developers and researchers of the respon-
dents of the survey have 4 years experience (22 respondents) in
smart contracts development, the minimum, average, and median
numbers are 0.2, 2.31, and 2.5 years, respectively. Compared
to the experiences of the respondents (including developers and
researchers) of previous works, e.g., in machine learning [52]
(min: 3, max: 16, median: 6, avg: 7.6 years), in desktop software
development [53] (min: 3, max: 12, avg: 6.5 years), the smart
contract developers and researchers seem less experienced.
4.2 Corrective Maintenance Issues
It is not easy to discover all potential bugs before deploying
smart contracts to the blockchain. Some bugs / errors of the
contracts might be exposed to the public under certain situations.
Corrective maintenance is the modification of a smart contract
after deployment to the blockchain to correct discovered bugs
/ errors. Diagnosing errors of smart contracts is the major task
in corrective maintenance. However, it is painful and difficult to
diagnose errors in a smart contract. According to our survey, 96
(66.2%) respondents complain that debugging and testing is not
easy. There are two main reasons that lead to the difficulty of the
diagnosing errors, i.e., the lack of mature tools and community
support.
4.2.1 The Lack of Mature Tools
Many previous works [10], [14], [54] mentioned that smart con-
tract development lacks appropriate tools / techniques to verify
code correctness. Thus, it is not easy to fix bugs in smart contracts.
The same answers are also received in our survey. 96 (66.2%)
respondents claim that they cannot find useful tools to debug /
test / audit their contracts. However, with the development of
smart contract ecosystems, a large number of tools have been
developed. For example, tools based on static analysis [19], [55],
[56] and formal verification [57]–[59] have been proposed. Some
tools have excellent performance and speed in detecting common
security issues. Thus, “lack of tools” seems to be addressed with
the effort of researchers and developers. There is a gap between
academia and industry, as many tools developed in academia are
not yet known about and used in industry.
To find the reason, we asked how developers obtain their
required knowledge about smart contracts. The Solidity documen-
tation, blogs, and Q&A website are the top three most popular
sources to acquire knowledge; the numbers are 149 (90.3%),
114 (69.1%), and 88 (53.3%), respectively. The state-of-art tools
usually published in academic journal and conference papers, and
86 (59.3%) respondents said journal and conference papers are an
important approach to require knowledge. Thus, the methods to
require knowledge is not the main reason why developers think
that there are not enough tools.
We also investigated the usage conditions for different kinds of
tools and how developers test their contracts. We found that only
947 (28.48%) and 15 (9.09%) respondents use static analysis tools
and formal verification tools to test their smart contracts. Unit
testing, code reviews, functional and integration testing are still
the most popular methods to test smart contracts. About 80.61%,
73.94%, and 70.91% of respondents choose these methods to test
their contracts. Developer comments said that “although there are
many tools that can be chosen, most of them are hard to use and
not user friendly”. Thus, although there is a large number of tools
that have been developed, developers still complain there are only
a few tools they think can be used in practice.
4.2.2 The Lack of Community Support
Community support is a primary source of knowledge for
blockchain software projects [16]. Community support consists
of many parts. For example, when developers encounter technical
problems, a Q&A website such as Stack Overflow is an important
source to help them address the problems. Developers can open
source their projects to Github. Other developers can submit issue
reports to help them polish the projects. The App store is also an
important place to receive reviews. Reviews might contain feature
requests, user feedbacks, issue reports that can help developers
upgrade their software.
However, community support is not enough for smart contract
developers. Previous works [14], [60] found that smart contract
developers lack community support as the blockchain technology
is new and there are not enough smart contract developers to
answer their questions. Since more and more developers take part
in smart contract development, we used our survey to investigate
whether community support is still lacking in Ethereum.
In our survey, we asked respondents to give a score for the
community support. Score 1 refers to ‘very unsatisfied’, 3 refers to
‘neutrality’, and 5 means ‘very satisfied’. The community support
receives an average score of 3.03, while the score for other
comparative items e.g., Solidity document, and Smart contract
Explorer receive scores of 3.53 and 3.52, respectively. Thus
developers still believe that community support is not sufficient
compared to other resources. Surprisingly, the score for the Q&A
website, e.g, Stack Overflow, is 3.43, which can show that the
Q&A website is not the culprit for the lack of community support.
We found that the score for the “Comments from public (E.g.,
DApp, Github)” is only 2.57, which is the lowest score among all
the comparative items.
Previous works [14], [60] claimed that smart contract de-
velopers lack community support because there are not enough
smart contract developers to answer technical questions. However,
our survey shows a different answer. The culprit for the lack of
community support is not the Q&A website, but the comments
from the public, e.g., issue reports from Github, comments from
App Store.
4.3 Adaptive Maintenance Issues
Adaptive maintenance aims to keep a software product usable in
a changed or changing environment. In traditional software, the
environment changes are usually reflected in the upgrading of
the operating systems, the hardware, or software, e.g., database.
Conducting adaptive maintenance for the traditional environment
changing is not difficult, as these kinds of environment changes are
predictable. For example, the updated operating systems usually
will give a specific date and detailed API documents.
However, the environment of smart contracts is more unpre-
dictable. In this subsection, we highlight three challenges, which
makes it is not easy to conduct adaptive maintenance for smart
contracts.
4.3.1 Unpredictable Miner Behaviors
Unlike traditional programs that usually run on local machines, all
the transactions of smart contracts are running on the blockchain.
Blockchain is a peer-to-peer network; its nodes, so-called “min-
ers”, are responsible for the execution of transactions. Miners
execute and collect transactions into a data structure, named
blocks. If the newly generated block is valid, it will be added
at the last block of the whole blockchain. It is then noticed by
other nodes for adding as a new block to their ledgers, which is
the so-called distributed ledger. The miner who helps to generate
the block can get some Ethers as a reward. The transaction sender
needs to pay some transaction fee, which is calculated by the
gas cost× gas price. (See Section 2).
However, some miners misbehave so as to earn more compared
to the standard income [37]. Even worse, it is impossible to know
which miner executes the contract, thus it is difficult to conduct
related adaptive maintenance methods to make smart contracts
usable in the changing environment.
Below we give some example attacks launched from miners.
Block Info Dependency [19], [42] . Ethereum does not provide
methods to generate random numbers, while random numbers are
important in some applications, e.g, lottery, gambling. Since the
block information is random, for example, block hash number, the
timestamp of the block, some developers use block related APIs,
e.g., block.blockhash, block.timestamp to obtain block related
information, and use this information to generate random numbers.
However, the miner can control the time of generating a block by
roughly 900 seconds. Thus, the miner can control the result of the
random numbers to some extent.
51% Attack [61] . The probability of mining a block in Ethereum
depends on the computing powers of miners. The miner can
control the blockchain system, if a miner has more than 51%
computing power. There is now no one who can control such
big computing power to control the blockchain system. However,
previous work [61] reported that both Ethereum and Bitcoin have
a centralized trend. There are more and more people join together
in order to mine more blocks and hence become a “mining
pool”. Up to now, the top 5 mining pools have more than 51%
of computational powers [62]. In the future, it is likely for the
top mining pools to launch 51% to attack some valuable smart
contracts, which might make contracts hard to maintain.
Selfish Mining [63], [64]. Eyal and Sirer [65] find the blockchain
network, e.g., Ethereum, can be vulnerable when a miner holds
25% of the computational resource. The miner can earn profits
by using a selfish mining strategy. In a selfish mining strategy, the
powerful miners hold the mined blocks and continued to mine new
blocks. Since the selfish miner holds a powerful computational
resource, his private branch is longer than the current public chain.
Then, the miner broadcasts his private branch, and the longest
branch will be accepted by all the miners. In this case, the selfish
miner earns more Ethers. However, the blocks mined by honest
miners and the transactions on these blocks will be reversed, which
can lead to some unpredictable errors or attacks of contracts.
According to our survey, 76 (46.06%) respondents worried that
the presence of misbehaving miners can increase the difficulty of
smart contract maintenance. It is currently a big challenge for
developers to conduct related adaptive maintenance methods to
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make smart contracts usable in a environment which contains
misbehaving miners.
4.3.2 Unpredictable Fork Problems
Ethereum uses soft forks and hard forks (See Section 2.2) to
update the blockchain system. Some forks are planned, while some
are controversial unpredictable forks, which might result in smart
contract maintenance needs.
In a planned fork, developers are informed in advance, and
they usually do not need to update the code of smart contracts. For
example, in 2017, a hard fork named “Byzantium” of Ethereum
added a ‘REVERT’ opcode, which permits error handling without
consuming all gas [66]. The function revert() in smart contract
code will refer to the new opcode automatically. Thus, the planned
forks are more likely to be accepted by miners and developers.
However, unplanned forks are also common in Ethereum,
which can increase the difficulty of smart contract maintenance.
The first unplanned fork happened in July 2016 and was the
result of the DAO attack [30]. The DAO attack made the DAO
(Decentralized Autonomous Organization) lose 3.6 million Ethers.
To retrieve the loss, the DAO appealed for a hard fork. The hard
fork reversed all the transactions to the block before the attack.
This hard fork is controversial, as many miners believe it breaks
the law of Ethereum. The opposition miners did not take part in
the fork, and a new blockchain was generated, named Ethereum
Classic (ETC) [67]. After the hard fork, both ETC and Ethereum
contain the same smart contracts. Thus, which contracts to main-
tain might be a problem for some developers. The same situation
also happened to their callee contracts. For example, contract A
has two callee contracts, i.e., contract B and C. Unfortunately,
contract B chooses to maintain the contract on ETC, while contract
C chooses to maintain the contract on Ethereum. Thus, contract A
will always have a unmaintained callee contract.
In Oct. 2016 and Nov. 2016, two unpredictable hard forks
were launched to address different problems that have arisen from
the DoS attacks. These two hard forks named “EIP-150 Hard
Fork” [31] and “Spurious Dragon” [32], respectively. In “EIP-
150 Hard Fork”, Ethereum increased the gas cost of every type of
call from 40 to 700 unit. The “Spurious Dragon” also increases
the gas cost of the “EXP” opcode. This increased gas cost might
increase the risk of “out-of-gas error”. Thus, some contracts need
to refactor their code to handle these gas cost changes.
According to our survey, 83 (50.30%) respondents are afraid
that the forks of Ethereum might result in various potential prob-
lems for their smart contracts. Moreover, the unpredictable forks
make it difficult for developers to perform adaptive maintenance.
4.3.3 Unpredictable Callee Contracts
Ethereum is a permission-less network; every one can call the
function of the smart contract by sending a transaction. Michael
et al. [68] investigated the call relations of smart contracts on
Ethereum by checking the hard code address on their bytecode.
They found that it is very common for smart contracts to call each
other in Ethereum. Similar results can also be found from a famous
Dapp store named The State of DApps 6. We can find that a DApp
usually consists of several smart contracts. These contracts have
different functionalities and call each other to make up the whole
DApp.
6. https://www.stateofthedapps.com/
However, call relations also make smart contracts hard to
maintain as the state of the callee contracts might be unpredictable.
In general, the caller contracts might not be sure of the state of
the callee contract. Because several contracts might call the same
callee contract at the same time, this might change the state of
the callee contract. Even if the caller contract is the first one who
sends the transaction to the callee contract, it is not guaranteed
that his transaction will be executed first. This is because all the
transactions are executed by miners, and miners can decide the
transaction execution orders. Thus, there is no certain method to
ensure the transaction order, or the state of the callee contract.
Michael et al. also found that many callee contracts on
Ethereum contain vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities might not
affect the normal running of the contracts, but it is possible that the
callee contracts might be crashed and cannot work in the future.
Even worse, some callee contracts can be destructed by calling the
Selfdestruct function when an attack happens. If so, it can lead to
financial loss by the caller contracts, as all the Ethers sent to the
destructed contract will be locked forever.
According to our survey, 103 (62.42%) respondents said it
would make their contracts hard to be maintained if the states
of the caller contracts change. Since the scalability issues of
Solidity and Ethereum (See Section 4.4.1), it is not easy to merge
all functionalities into a single contract. However, splitting smart
contracts into several contracts can also make smart contracts hard
to be maintained when the state of callee changes.
4.4 Perfective Maintenance Issues
As long-lived software [69], users are likely to elicit new re-
quirements during the entire smart contract life cycle. Thus,
adding additional functionalities, performance enhancement, and
efficiency and maintainability improvements for smart contracts
are necessary to respond to the new requirements. This is called
the perfective maintenance of smart contracts. Thus, there is a
coverage between perfective maintenance issues with development
issues, as some new functionalities are required to be developed
during this maintenance process.
However, due to the scalability issues of Solidity and EVM, it
is not easy to add too many functionalities to smart contract-based
projects. The Gas system also increases the difficulty of perfective
maintenance. Due to these issues, we find that only 24 (14.55%) of
the respondents to our survey believe smart contracts are suitable
for developing a large scale project.
4.4.1 The Scalability Issues
Solidity. Solidity is the most popular programming language for
smart contract development, which is an object-oriented language
and a bit like JavaScript. However, the grammar of Solidity is
too simple to support large projects and it scales poorly [14].
First, Solidity misses the support of exception handling, e.g., the
try...catch in Java. Thus, it will be a big challenge for Solidity
developers to test their contracts, especially when more and more
functionalities are added. Additionally, 82 (49.70%) respondents
to our survey said there are not enough useful libraries and
APIs. Thus, developers need to develop various kinds of APIs
and libraries which increases the difficulty of implementing new
requirements. Finally, 62 (37.58%) and 64 (38.79%) respondents
also said it is also not easy to handle the memory and storage
in Solidity programming, respectively. For example, Solidity only
allows creating 16 local variables in a function. Thus, developers
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have to use storage variables instead of local variables. However,
with an increasing number of storage variables, it is not easy
to manage the storage. For example, three data types in Solidity
programming, i.e., struct, mapping array, are stored in storage by
default. Since storage variables will not be released automatically,
the management of storage will be more difficult and expensive in
a large-scale smart contract project. This storage is expensive in
Ethereum, the more storage a contract needs, the more gas will be
consumed.
Peter et al. [60] investigated more than 40,000 smart contracts
on Ethereum using 16 metrics, e.g., LOC, nesting level. They
found the smart contracts are neither overly complex nor coupled
much, and do not rely heavily on inheritance. Their results also
show that real-world smart contracts are not able to support too
many functionalities.
EVM. The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is the runtime
environment for smart contracts in Ethereum. Some features of
EVM make it scale poorly to support large-scale projects. First,
EVM does not support multi-thread execution, which makes
the execution of smart contracts inefficient. In some large-scale
projects, it is important to execute multiple functionalities in
parallel to increase execution speed. Second, EVM limits the
maximum size of stack to 1024 items with 256 bits for each
item. The limited stack sizes can easily lead to vulnerabilities
and increase the difficulty of developing complex applications.
Finally, Ethereum uses a key-value store, which is a very simplistic
database and can lead to low efficiency.
Ethereum. Ethereum does not support concurrency. To construct
the blockchain and ensure security, each node on Ethereum stores
the entire transaction history and current state of Ethereum, e.g.,
account balance, contract variables. Thus, all transactions must be
executed and verified by all the nodes. This mechanism makes
Ethereum support only around 15 transactions per second, leading
to serious scalability issues of smart contract applications.
In Dec. 2017, a popular game application named CryptoKit-
ties [8] was published on Ethereum. The game allows players to
buy and breed pets on Ethereum. However, the game popularity
slowed down all transactions, as too many players sent transactions
to the Ethereum. This event exposed major scalability issues of
Ethereum, showing that Ethereum might not be suitable for the
running of projects with a large number of users.
4.4.2 The Difficulty of Handling the Gas System
Ethereum adopts a unique gas system to execute the computational
cost of each transaction. The gas system ensures the normal
running of the Ethereum system, e.g., giving rewards for miners,
avoiding DoS Attack. However, this gas system is also not easy
to use, especially when the scale of the project becomes larger.
According to our survey, 64 (38.79%) respondents claim that it is
not easy to handle the gas system when maintaining their smart
contracts.
First, users need to pay Ethers for the gas cost, and the gas
cost depends on the computational cost of the code. Thus, it is
important for developers to reduce the gas cost. As we discussed
in Section 4.1.4, there is a trade-off between the gas cost and
the readability, and readability is very important for maintenance
and large-scale projects. According to previous works [70], [71],
over 90% of real smart contracts suffer from gas-costly patterns
in Ethereum. However, fixing these gas-costly patterns and reduce
the readability of smart contracts.
With the increasing number of transactions and users, the gas
cost of a function can increase rapidly, and might lead to an “out-
of-gas error”. Previous works [42], [72] introduced a gas-related
vulnerability named Nested Call. The vulnerable contract uses
a loop to send Ethers to its users. The maximum loop iteration
equals the number of users. The gas consumption of sending
Ethers is expensive in Ethereum. Thus, with the increasing number
of users, the gas consumption of the contract will increase rapidly.
Since the gas limit cannot change, it is likely for the contract to
have an “out-of-gas error” when the number of users reaches a
certain number.
4.5 Preventive Maintenance Issues
Preventive maintenance aims to lessen the likelihood of a sudden
breakdown of the programs [73]. Guided by advanced software
engineering theories, preventive maintenance usually involves
some form of redesign or refactor of a smart contract to remove
latent faults / errors/ bugs. For example, a code smell is not a
bug but are any characteristics in the source code that possibly
indicates a deeper problem [13]. Refactoring the code to remove
code smells in software to increase its robustness is a typical
preventive maintenance method. However, due to the immature
ecosystem of smart contracts, it is not easy to find appropriate
advanced software engineering (SE) methods, e.g., code smells
for smart contracts, to perform preventive maintenance.
4.5.1 The Lack of Advanced SE Approach
During our literature review, we found that there are only a small
number of works that propose advanced SE methods to help
conduct the preventive maintenance of smart contracts. Most of
these works aim to improve the reliability of smart contracts,
e.g., security check tools (detailed introduced in RQ2). Com-
pared to traditional software, the maintenance methods of smart
contracts to remove latent errors are much less, e.g., code smell
removal [33], bug prediction [34], self-admitted technical debt
determination [35]. The lack of research data is an important issue.
In traditional software maintenance, a large number of MSR
(Mining Software Repository) methods have been developed to
help conduct preventive maintenance. For example, history bug re-
ports can be utilized to predict whether a source code file contains
latent errors [74]. User reviewers can provide feature requests
to help developer improve the programs [75], [76]. Comments in
source code can be used to detect self-admitted technical debate,
which can be used to remove future errors [35]. Privacy policies,
SO posts, error messages, and commit messages are wildly used to
help maintain traditional apps. These methods are not difficult to
be applied to smart contract projects. However, the lack of related
research data makes it is not easy to develop advanced SE methods
for smart contracts.
4.5.2 The Lack of High Quality Reference Code
High-quality reference source code can be a good example when
developers conduct preventive maintenance. However, the quali-
ties of open-source smart contracts are poor in Ethereum, and 63
(38.18%) respondents of our survey mentioned that Solidity lacks
useful reference code.
He et al. [18] found that the copy-paste vulnerabilities were
prevalent in Ethereum, and over 96% of smart contracts have
duplicates, which means the ecosystem of smart contracts on
Ethereum is highly homogeneous. Among these contracts, 9.7%
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of them have similar vulnerabilities. Similar findings are reported
by Kiffer et al. [77]; they investigated 1.2 million contracts,
and they can be reduced to 5,877 contract “clusters” that have
highly-similar bytecode. The highly homogeneous nature of smart
contracts show that only a limited number of contracts can be
referenced during maintenance and development.
Another work [77] found that more than 60% of smart con-
tracts are never actually called. These useless contracts make up
much noisy data on the Ethereum, and increase the difficulty
of code reuse of smart contracts. Similar findings were also
reported by [78]. They analyzed the bytecode of smart contracts
on Ethereum and found 44,883 contracts do not have any jumps
in their bytecode, which means these contracts are useless. Only
0.6% of the contracts have more than 1,000 transactions, while
most of the active contracts are similar ERC20 contracts [7], which
are used to make tokens. Thus, the active contracts also cannot
provide too much reference value.
Hegedus et al. [60] analyzed more than 40 thousand Solidity
source files. They found that the open sourced smart contract code
either quite well-commented or not commented at all. Without
comments in the source code, it is not easy for developers to
understand and reuse the reference code.
4.5.3 The Lack of Standards
Standards can give guidance for developers to increase the main-
tainability and reliability of their smart contracts, which is the
main motivation for preventive maintenance. For example, the
ERC 20 [7] standard defines some rules for token-related con-
tracts. The rules contain 9 functions (3 are optional) and 2 events.
This standard allows any tokens on Ethereum to be re-used by
other applications, e.g., wallets, decentralized exchanges. At the
end of 2017, the CryptoKitties [8] was published and swept the
globe. To help other developers develop similar applications, ERC
721 [79] was published in Jan. 2018. Developers can conduct
preventive maintenance to make their contracts follow the ERC
721 standard. Thus, their applications can much more easily
interact with other similar applications.
However, there are only limited numbers of smart contract
related standards [80]. According to our survey, 82 (49.70%)
respondents said Ethereum lacks standards, which increases the
difficulty of the maintenance of smart contracts.
5 RQ2: THE CURRENT MAINTENANCE METHODS
FOR SMART CONTRACTS
We provide the answers for our second Research Question, and
introduce the current smart contract maintenance methods used
identified from 41 analysed research papers.
5.1 Distribution
Among our 131 smart contract selected papers, 41 papers proposed
methods that can be used to maintain smart contracts. Unlike
traditional software where programs can be upgraded directly,
smart contracts need to redeploy new versions to the blockchain
and discard old versions. Most maintenance methods check se-
curity issues of smart contracts before redeploying them to the
blockchain, which are so-called offline checking methods. There
are 31 papers related to this topic. 7 research papers propose
methods that can help maintain a deployed smart contracts. This
kind of method is called an online checking method. The final three
Offline 
Checking, 
31
Online 
Checking, 7
Others,
3
Fuzzing, 5
Machine 
Learning, 4
Program 
Analysis, 15
Formal 
Verification, 
5
Others,
2
Fig. 4: Distribution of Maintenance Methods
papers introduce a method that uses DELEGATECALL to upgrade
a smart contract, and a method that redeploys smart contracts by
using Selfdestruct function, respectively. The distribution of these
methods is shown in Figure 4.
5.2 Offline Checking Methods
Table 4 summarises the 31 publications which use offline checking
methods to help maintain smart contracts. Developers can use
the proposed methods to check for security vulnerabilities to
help them to maintain smart contracts. For example, using the
proposed methods to locate bugs during corrective maintenance,
and checking for vulnerabilities of the update versions before
redeploying them to Ethereum. We divide the methods presented
in these papers into five categories – program analysis, fuzzing,
formal verification, machine learning, and others. In the following
subsections, we discuss some key examples.
5.2.1 Program Analysis
CFG Based Tools. In 2016, Luu et al. identified four kinds of
new security issues of smart contracts and proposed the first tool,
named Oyente, to detect them through Ethereum bytecode. Al-
though EVM is a stack-based machine, similar to JVM, Ethereum
bytecode has many differences compared to the Java bytecode.
For example, Java bytecode has a clearly-defined set of targets for
every jump, but the jump position of Ethereum bytecode needs to
be calculated during symbolic execution. Thus, Oyente first splits
opcodes into several blocks and then uses symbolic execution to
build CFG (Control Flow Graph). CFG stores the relationship
between blocks, e.g., jump, conditional jump. Based on the CFG,
Oyente defines several rules to detect related security issues.
A similar method to that of Oyente has been widely applied by
other tools. For instance, GasReducer [70] and GasChecker [71]
are tools used to detect some gas-inefficient patterns. They use
the CFG generated by Oyente, and design patterns to detect
related security vulnerability patterns. Besides, Torres et al. [50],
Chang [85], Nikolic et al. [84], Zhou et al. [82], Krupp et al. [86],
Mossberg et al. [88] also use similar methods that design rules
based on the CFG to detect other smart contract vulnerabilities.
Some works make optimizations, e.g., Maian [84] validate the
results of the symbolic execution by using a concrete validation
step. In the concrete validation, they create a private fork of
Ethereum and then run the result generated by the symbolic
execution to check its correctness. Since the results are generated
by symbolic execution, and concrete validation is used to increase,
performance, we also classify Maian in this category.
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TABLE 4: Literature of Offline Checking Methods
Category Name of Publications Years
Program Analysis
OSIRIS: Hunting for Integer Bugs in Ethereum Smart Contracts [81] 2018
The art of the scam: Demystifying honeypots in ethereum smart contracts [50] 2019
Security Assurance for Smart Contract [82] 2018
Vandal: A Scalable Security Analysis Framework for Smart Contracts [83] 2018
MadMax: surviving out-of-gas conditions in Ethereum smart contracts [72] 2018
Finding The Greedy, Prodigal, and Suicidal Contracts at Scale [84] 2018
sCompile: Critical Path Identification and Analysis for Smart Contracts [85] 2019
teether: Gnawing at Ethereum to Automatically Exploit Smart Contracts [86] 2018
Making Smart Contracts Smarter [87] 2016
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contract [88] 2019
SmartCheck: Static Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts [56] 2018
TokenScope: Automatically Detecting Inconsistent Behaviors of Cryptocurrency Tokens in Ethereum [89] 2019
Towards saving money in using smart contracts [70] 2018
GasChecker: Scalable Analysis for Discovering Gas-Inefficient Smart Contracts [71] 2020
Securify: Practical Security Analysis of Smart Contracts [90] 2018
Formal Verification
Formal Verification of Smart Contracts [57] 2016
A formal verification tool for Ethereum VM bytecode [91] 2018
Kevm: A complete formal semantics of the ethereum virtual machine [59] 2018
Towards verifying ethereum smart contract bytecode in Isabelle/HOL [92] 2018
ZEUS: Analyzing Safety of Smart Contracts [93] 2018
Fuzzing
ContractFuzzer: fuzzing smart contracts for vulnerability detection [94] 2018
ReGuard: Finding Reentrancy Bugs in Smart Contracts [47] 2018
EVMFuzz: Differential Fuzz Testing of Ethereum Virtual Machine [95] 2019
sFuzz: An Efficient Adaptive Fuzzer for Solidity Smart Contracts [96] 2020
Exploiting the Laws of Order in Smart Contracts [97] 2019
Machine Learning
S-gram: Towards Semantic-Aware Security Auditing for Ethereum Smart Contracts [98] 2018
Hunting the Ethereum Smart Contract: Color-inspired Inspection of Potential Attacks [99] 2018
Towards Safer Smart Contracts: A Sequence Learning Approach to Detecting Security Threats [100] 2019
Checking Smart Contracts with Structural Code Embedding [101] 2020
Others
Designing Secure Ethereum Smart Contracts: A Finite State Machine Based Approach [102] 2018
Mutation Testing for Ethereum Smart Contract [103] 2019
Decompilers. Vandal [83] is a decompiler for smart contract
bytecode. Its output includes a control-flow graph, three-address
code for all operations, and function boundaries. Based on Vandal,
developers and researchers can develop other tools to maintain
their smart contracts. For example, MadMax [72] uses logic-
based specifications to detect gas-focused vulnerabilities of smart
contracts based on the output of Vandal. Tsankov et al. [90]
proposed a tool named Securify, which uses semantic information
to detect vulnerabilities of smart contracts bytecode. Securify first
decompiles the EVM bytecode. It then analyzes the data flow and
control flow dependencies. Finally, it uses several patterns to check
related vulnerabilities.
Transaction-based Tools. TokenScope is the first tool that uses
transaction histories to detect inconsistent behaviors of ERC20
Tokens. By using the stored Ethereum transaction records, Token-
Scope identifies three key information of contract bytecode, i.e.,
core data structures, standard interfaces, and standard events. It
then compares the key information with the standard to find any
inconsistent tokens.
Source Code Level Static Analysis. Detecting vulnerabilities
through bytecode is not easy as EVM removes some key informa-
tion while compiles source code to bytecode. SmartCheck takes
smart contract source code as input, and converts the code to the
AST (abstract syntax tree) [111]. Based on the AST, SmartCheck
uses several patterns to detect 21 kinds of smart contract issues.
5.2.2 Formal Verification
Formal verification is a method that uses formal methods of mathe-
matics to prove or disprove the correctness of a system [112]. This
method usually uses a formal proof on an abstract mathematical
model to make the verification.
Bhargavan et al. [57] proposed the first formal verification
tool for smart contracts based on the F* proof assistant [113], and
Amani et al. [92] presented a tool based on Isabelle/HOL [114].
However, both of these the tools only use incomplete semantics
of EVM, which might lead to errors. Thus, Park et al. [91] use
a complete and thoroughly tested formal semantics of EVM to
enhance the performance of their tool.
Kalra et al. [115] introduced 11 kinds of vulnerabilities of
smart contracts and proposed a tool named Zeus to detect seven of
them. Zeus takes source code as input and translates the Solidity
source code to LLVM bytecode. Based on the LLVM bytecode,
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TABLE 5: Literatures of Online Checking Methods.
Methodology Name of Publications Years
Bytecode Rewriting Smart Contract Defense through Bytecode Rewriting [104] 2019
Bytecode Rewriting Monitoring smart contracts: ContractLarva and open challenges beyond [105] 2018
Input Detection Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts [106] 2016
Input Detection FSFC: An input filter-based secure framework for smart contract [107] 2020
Transactions Detection ÆGIS: Smart Shielding of Smart Contracts [108] 2019
Transactions Detection VULTRON: Catching Vulnerable Smart Contracts Once and for All [109] 2019
State Detection Sereum: Protecting Existing Smart Contracts Against Re-Entrancy Attacks [48] 2018
Intrusion Detection ContractGuard: Defend Ethereum Smart Contracts with Embedded Intrusion Detection [110] 2019
Zeus designs several policy violations and uses a verifier to
determine assertion violations.
5.2.3 Fuzzing
Fuzzing for smart contracts is an automated testing technique
which uses random, unexpected, or invalid data as the input to
the contract. Such input data is expected to lead to detecting
some unwanted behaviors, e.g., crashes, failure of some functions,
permission errors.
Jiang et al. [94] proposed the first fuzzing tool named Con-
tractFuzzer, which applies fuzzing to detect seven kinds of se-
curity issues. ContractFuzzer utilizes smart contract ABI [20]
to generate fuzzing inputs. Then, they define test oracles and
use static analysis to log smart contracts runtime behaviors.
Finally, ContractFuzzer analyzes the logs to find security issues.
The following works make some optimization. For example,
sFuzz [96] can cover more branches to find more security issues.
EthRacer [97] can run directly on Ethereum bytecode and without
the need of ABI, which enlarges the usage scenario. ReGuard [47]
provides a web service for developers to make it is easy to
use. EVMFuzz [95] designs a differential fuzz testing framework,
which supports different programming languages for EVM smart
contracts.
5.2.4 Machine Learning
With the development of the Ethereum ecosystem, some develop-
ers have used machine learning to help maintain smart contracts.
Machine learning related methods need a ground truth to train
the model. S-gram [98] uses Oyente to obtain the ground truth
and utilizes a combination of N-gram language modeling and
lightweight static semantic labeling to predict potential vulnerabil-
ities. SmartEmbed [101] uses SmartCheck to label the vulnerabil-
ities,and utilizes deep-learning to train the model to predict smart
contract vulnerabilities. Tann et al. [100] use MAIAN to label the
security issues and use LSTM to predict potential issues. Huang
et al. [99] first translate the bytecode into RGB color. Based on a
manually labeled dataset, they use a convolutional neural network
to train the model and predict the security issues.
5.2.5 Other Approaches
Mavridou et al. [102] proposed a tool, named FSolidM, to au-
tomatically generate smart contracts. They claim that the gener-
ated contracts are bug-free and can reduce development efforts.
FSolidM regards smart contracts as finite state machines (FSMs).
Based on FSMs, they provide a set of plugins that contain common
contract design patterns and a graphical interface. Developers can
add plugins to the contracts to improve security and functionali-
ties.
Wu et al. [103] use mutation testing to enhance the security of
smart contracts. Mutation testing is a type of white-box software
testing technique that changes some statements of the code and
check if the test cases can find some errors. This method is based
on well-defined mutation operators, and the mutation operators
only make minor changes to the programs. Wu et al. designed 15
mutation operators, e.g., variable units, keywords, and use them to
find bugs on smart contracts.
5.3 Online Checking Methods
Online checking methods can help smart contract developers
defend their contracts against attacks even after they have been
deployed. Table 5 introduces seven publications that use online
checking methods to help maintain smart contracts. However, most
of the online checking methods cannot be used directly and need
to be merged into the EVM.
Ayoade et al. [104] proposed a method that can automatically
detect vulnerable EVM bytecode segments and uses a guarded
bytecode segment to replace it. Their tool is based on predefined
policy rules and can only support a limited number of simple
rules. Similarly, ContractLarva [105] insert protection code into
the source code of smart contracts. This updated bytecode can
defend against related attacks.
TownCrier [106] and FSFC [107] provide approaches to detect
malicious input to protect smart contracts. TownCrier can be
regarded as a bridge between the smart contracts and frond-
end programs, e.g., websites. When a frond-end program sends
transactions to smart contracts, TownCrier uses a combination
of Software Guard Extensions [116] and Intels recently released
trusted hardware capability [117] to check whether the input data
can be trusted. FSFC is a filter-based security framework for smart
contracts. It uses several firewall rules and uses a monitor to
identify malicious input.
ÆGIS [108] and VULTRON [109] detect and reverse malicious
transactions to protect smart contracts. ÆGIS uses predefined
patters to identify malicious transactions. VULTRON compares
the actual transferred Ethers and the normal transfered Ethers to
find malicious transactions.
Sereum [48] monitors state updates of smart contracts, such as
changes to storage variables, to detect re-entrancy attacks. There
are two components of Sereum, i.e., a taint engine and an attack
detector. Sereum focuses on conditional jumps and the data that
influences the conditional jumps. The taint engine is used to detect
the change of state update, which loads to conditional jumps.
When a re-entrancy attack happens, the state will be updated
multiple times. Once the attack detector detects such malicious
behaviors, the transaction will be reversed.
ContractGuard [110] is the first intrusion detection system for
smart contracts against attacks. It monitors the network for ab-
normal behaviors. To detect abnormal behaviors, ContractGuard
deploys smart contracts on a testbed and trains a model. When
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malicious activities are detected, ContractGuard will reverse the
transactions to recover the contract states and raise an alarm to the
contract owner.
5.4 Other Methods
Colombo et al. [118] introduced a specification-driven method that
uses the DELEGATECALL instruction to upgrade smart contracts
when unwanted behaviors are detected. To detect unwanted be-
haviors, they predefined several checkpoints for smart contracts.
The checkpoints monitor the important state of smart contracts,
e.g., its balance. When an unexpected behavior is detected, the
checkpoints will revert the transactions to ensure the safety of the
contracts. Finally, developers are required to upgrade contracts by
using the DELEGATECALL instruction.
Marino et al. [119] defined several standards for smart con-
tracts and suggested developers add a Selfdestruct function in the
contracts. When the contract is attacked, the developers can undo
the contracts. A similar suggestion is given by Chen et al. [42].
They suggest developers add an interrupter in the contracts.
Interrupter is a mechanism to stop the contract when unwanted
behaviors are detected, and Selfdestruct function is an easy way to
stop the contract.
6 RQ3: WHAT SHOULD WE DO IN THE FUTURE?
In this section, we highlight some future research directions
and give some suggestions for both developers and researchers
according to our RQ1 and RQ2 findings presented in previous
sections.
6.1 Improving the Smart Contract Ecosystem
DApp Store and Comment System. Although there are some
DApp stores for smart contracts, none of them have a smart
contract verification system. They neither reject cloned contracts,
nor have a rating system. As we discussed in RQ1, many copy-
paste vulnerabilities are prevalent in the Ethereum blockchain’s
deployed smart contracts. There are also many useless smart
contracts i.e. “dead” contracts in Ethereum. These contracts are the
noisy data on the blockchain and increase the difficulty of finding
useful smart contracts. According to our survey, 139 (84.24%)
developers have positive opinions about the need for a DApp
store like the Android Google Play Store. Such a DApp store
could regulate the behaviors of smart contracts. For example,
rejecting copied contracts, rating useful contracts, giving various
classifications for contracts. Thus, developers could more easily
find high quality contracts for reference or for use as callee
contracts. A review system would allow smart contract users
to submit reviews when they find bugs or suggest features that
need to be improved. Such comments can help developers better
maintain their contracts. It could also be a valuable research
dataset. Based on such a dataset, many traditional MSR methods
can be applied to help improve and maintain smart contracts. For
example, as we introduced in the previous section, there are five
machine learning-based methods to help maintain smart contracts.
However, four of them use other tools to label the ground truth,
and there are many false positives / negatives of the tools that
used to label the ground truths. Thus, the performance of these
tools is not very good. Real-world produced data, e.g., review
comments, could substantially improve the performance of these
machine learning tools, just as it has for many traditional software
maintenance activities and tools.
Call for High-Quality Standards, Libraries and Reference
Code. Although Ethereum has had a rapid improvement in its
ecosystem, developers still claim there is a lack of standards, li-
braries, and useful reference code. Currently, most of the standards
are published on EIPs [80], and many teams provide libraries and
referee code, e.g., OpenZepplelin Contracts [120], Smart contract
best practice [121]. However, the number is still small and not
enough for the vast Ethereum ecosystem.
More User Friendly Tools. In previous sections, we introduced
41 works which can help maintain smart contracts. However,
according to our survey, 96 (66.2%) respondents claim they cannot
find useful tools to debug / test / audit their contracts, or such
tools are too hard to use or deploy in real-world smart contract
development. An important reason for this inconsistency is that
most current tools are not easy to use for practitioners. Thus,
making these tools easier to deploy and use is an important task for
the future. For example, merging some tools into smart contract
IDEs, or adding a user interface to the tools.
6.2 Improving Ethereum and Solidity
Merging Cutting-Edge Technologies. The previous section in-
troduced eight online checking methods that can help maintain
smart contracts, even after they have been deployed. However,
most of the online checking methods cannot be used directly.
For example, transaction detection methods can revert malicious
transactions, but they need to be merged into the EVM. Similar
to bytecode rewrite methods, these methods can fix a buggy
bytecode snippet even they are deployed. Thus, merging cutting-
edge technologies into Ethereum could be used to improve the
security and maintainability of smart contracts.
Mitigating Scalability Issues. The scalability issue is one of the
main challenges for smart contract maintenance. Several methods
have been proposed to help redesign Ethereum to mitigate this
issue. First, the sharding technology is a future direction for
Ethereum to address the scalability issues. Currently, all the nodes
on Ethereum need to process every transaction, which leads to
low throughput. By applying sharding to Ethereum, the whole
network can be split into several smaller parts, called shards. A
subset of the total miner nodes would only process transactions on
a certain shard. Thus, it can improve the throughput of Ethereum
multiple times. Such sharding technology can also enable a smart
contract be executed by multiple threads. A contract could then be
split into several parts and executed by different nodes. Enlarging
the maximum stack sizes and reduce the gas cost of the storage
can also mitigate the scalability issues. This mechanism aims to
reduce the bulky problems of Ethereum, where all the nodes store
the whole blockchain data. If the bulky problem is addressed, it
is not difficult to make an optimization for stack size, database
performance, and price for storage. Bruce et al. [122] proposed
a new data structure named an account tree. The account tree
holds the balance of all non-empty addresses, which enables us to
remove old transactions. Thus, new nodes do not need to store all
transactions and can reduce the total bulk of the blockchain.
Permission Management. The current permission-less of
Ethereum leads to higher security requirements for smart con-
tracts. Thus, a permission management system is important to bet-
ter support the security of smart contracts and address maintenance
issues brought about by lack of permissions. For example, owners
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could hide some sensitive information in their smart contracts,
e.g., balance. Using white lists or black lists that allow or block
function calls from certain accounts can also prevent some attacks.
Trusted Modification Methods. In Section 4.1.1, we introduced
four modification methods for smart contracts. Among them, using
the Selfdestruct function and developing upgradeable contracts
cost the least. However, these two methods can lead to a major
trust concern from the users and other security issues. Previous
work [45] introduced a method to reduce the trust and security
concern for the usage of the Selfdestruct function, which can
also be applied to upgradeable contracts. This method suggests
that developers should distribute the rights to the users of the
contracts. They could vote to decide whether the contracts should
be destructed or upgraded. Using consensus protocols, such as
PoS [123], DPoS [124] are examples of such voting. For example,
if a user invests 100 Ethers to the contract, the user has 100 score
to vote. The more Ethers users invest contracts, the more rights
they have. When the voting process finished, users who do not
agree can transfer their Ethers to other accounts. Also, the delay
can reduce the risk of the Ethers locking, as Ethers transferred to
the destructed address will be locked forever. During the voting
and delaying steps, developers should suspend the function of the
contracts to prevent attacks or other unwanted behaviors.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY
7.1 Internal Validity
In this paper, we answered three research questions by performing
a literature review. Most of the papers (74.05%) are published
between 2017 to 2019, and their findings and studies may be
outdated as the Ethereum ecosystem is fast-evolving. For example,
Solidity, the most popular programming language for smart con-
tracts, has 80 versions from Jan. 2016 to Jun. 2020 [125]. Thus, it
is likely that some findings and results in the publications are out-
of-date. To reduce this threat, we used an online survey to collect
the opinion from many real-world smart contract developers. We
compared our literature review findings with the feedback from
developers to help ensure the overall validity of our findings.
It is possible that the respondents to our survey may provide
some dishonest or unprofessional answers. To reduce this influ-
ence, we first informed developers that we will not collect personal
information when sending the invitation emails. The survey is
anonymous and we cannot trace their information if they do not
leave their email address. All questions are optional, which means
developers can choose to answer a part of the questions. According
to Ong et al.’s [126] work, confidentiality and anonymity are useful
to obtain un-biased data from survey respondents.
To collect more responses, we translated our survey into a
Chinese version to address the language barrier and as Google
cannot be visited in China. There might be inconsistency between
the Chinese and English versions of our surveys. Besides, all the
respondents are written in Chinese, which needs to translate to
English when analyzing the data. This process also might lead to
some errors. To reduce this risk, two Chinese authors with good
English skills read the survey and responses several times to ensure
the correctness of the translation.
7.2 External Validity
We collected responses to our survey by sending emails to
Github developers. However, we might have missed some other
developers who might have different opinions. Fortunately, the
survey results show that the respondents to our survey have a wide
variety of backgrounds in terms of experience in developing smart
contracts, job roles, and open source projects they contribute to.
Thus, the diversity of backgrounds help us to trust the survey
results and can reflect real-world situations of Ethereum smart
contract development.
In the future, new functionalities will be added to Ethereum
and Solidity. They might also be updated to help better address
some smart contract maintenance issues. Thus, some findings and
results in this paper might be out-of-date in the future. This is an
inevitable trend for smart contract related empirical studies. While
the methods we have identified are still working, our findings can
help developers and researchers.
8 RELATED WORK
We review previous key empirical studies on smart contracts, and
highlight the difference between our work at the end of the section.
Survey Based Smart Contract Empirical Studies. Zhou et
al. [14] summarized the key challenges of smart contract develop-
ment by interviewing 20 developers from Github and industry who
have rich experience in smart contract development. They then
used an online survey to validate their findings. Their research
introduced several of the challenges of smart contract develop-
ment in terms security issues, development tools, programming
languages, EVM, performance, and online learning resources.
Bosu et al. [10] pre-designed some questions and used an
online survey to collect the opinions from Github smart contract
developers. Their work aimed to answer who contributes to smart
contracts and their motivation for development, what is the differ-
ence between smart contract development and traditional software
development, the challenges of smart contract development, and
what kinds of tools that developers feel they need.
Chakraborty et al. [16] sent an online survey to 1,604 smart
contract developers on Github and received 145 responses. Their
survey aimed to find the best current software development
practices for smart contracts. Their findings suggest that some
traditional software engineering practices are still working for
blockchain projects. They identified that the smart contract ecosys-
tem is immature and needs more SE methods, resources, and tools.
Chen et al. [42] defined 20 contract defects by analyzing
posts on Stack Exchange. They divided the defects into five
categories, i.e., security, availability, performance, maintainability,
and reusability defects. They claimed that removing these contract
defects can improve the robustness and enhance development
efficiency. To validate whether real-world developers regard these
contracts as harmful, they use an online survey to collect develop-
ers’ opinions. The results show that all the 20 contract defects are
potential harmful to smart contracts.
Literature Review Based Smart Contract Empirical Studies.
Conoscenti [37] et al. proposed an empirical study to help de-
velopers understand how to use smart contracts and blockchain
technology to build a decentralized and private-by-design IoT
system. To obtain key related information they conducted a sys-
tematic literature review based on 18 publications. Their work
introduced several use cases of blockchain in the IoT domain
and the factors affect integrity, anonymity, and adaptability of
blockchain technology.
Udokwu et al. [127] selected 48 publications from 496 papers.
Based on the selected papers, they described the key current usages
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of smart contract technology and challenges in adopting smart
contracts to other applications. Their analysis showed that the most
popular applications of smart contracts are supply chain manage-
ment, finance, healthcare, information security, smart city, and IoT.
They also identified 18 limitations of blockchain technology that
affects the adoption of smart contracts for other applications.
Macrinici et al. [128] pre-defined seven research questions
and selected 64 publications to find answers. Their results show
that the most popular topic in smart contract research is offering
solutions to address related problems, e.g, developing tools, proof-
of-concepts, and designing protocols. They also summarized 16
smart contract related problems and divided them into three
categories, i.e., blockchain mechanism, contract source code, and
EVM problems.
Security Related Smart Contract Empirical Study. Li et
al. [129] reviewed security issues for the blockchain systems from
2015 to 2017. They classified these issues into nine categories and
introduced the related causes. For example, one of the categories
is the “51% vulnerability” and the cause is the consensus mech-
anism. To help developers understand such attacks better, they
also gave example real attacks as case studies and analyzed the
vulnerabilities utilized by the attackers.
Bartoletti [130] found that the infamous Ponzi scheme has
migrated to Ethereum. Misbehaving developers use smart con-
tracts to design a Ponzi scheme to make money. Bartoletti et al.
manually checked real-world smart contracts and summarized four
kinds of Ponzi smart contracts, i.e., tree-shaped, chain-shaped,
waterfall, handover Ponzi scheme. To help further research on
Ponzi scheme detection, they manually labeled a dataset that
contains 184 schemes. A follow-up work [131], [132] used this
dataset to design machine learning methods to detect Ponzi smart
contracts.
Delmolino et al. [133] are the lectures of a university who
teach smart contract programming. They documented the pitfalls
of smart contracts according to their teaching experiences. The
pitfalls include errors in encoding state machines, failing to
use cryptography, misaligned incentives, and Ethereum-specific
mistakes.
Atzei et al. [49] studied attacks on smart contracts on Ethereum
between 2015 to 2017, and provided a classification of program-
ming pitfalls which might lead to the security issues of smart
contracts. Their work introduced six vulnerabilities in the Solidity
level, three vulnerabilities in the EVM level, and three vulner-
abilities in the blockchain level. For most of the vulnerabilities
introduced in the paper, a detailed introduction, code examples,
and attack examples are given to help readers better understand.
Other Smart Contract Empirical Studies. Zheng et al. [134] de-
scribed the challenges of developing smart contracts in the whole
life cycle, including creation challenges, deployment challenges,
execution challenges, and completion challenges. Their work not
only focused on the Ethereum platform. Thus, they also analysed
some differences between six smart contract platforms. Another
work [62] discussed the challenges of the blockchain system, and
the opportunities of blockchain technology. For the challenge, they
mainly focused on the architecture of blockchain and consensus
algorithms. For the opportunities, they introduced the applications
of blockchain, e.g., IoT, Finance. Reyna et al. [135] investigated
the challenges of applying blockchain technology to the IoT to
increase the security and reliability. Mohanta [136] introduced
seven uses cases for smart contracts, including supply chain, IoT,
and healthcare systems. Many empirical studies also focus on the
performance of smart contract tools [15], [137], programming lan-
guages [138]–[140], ecosystem [18], [60], [77], permissions [141],
design patterns [142], life cycle [78], call relations [22], [143].
In this paper, we summarized the key maintenance issues
and current maintenance methods for smart contracts as evidence
from our literature review. There may have been some similar
findings with prior works that focus on investigating develop-
ment challenges. Ours is however the most comprehensive work
that exclusively focuses on smart contract maintenance. As the
Ethereum ecosystem is a fast-evolving this might also lead to
the different findings from prior studies. For example, Zhou et
al. [14] mention that smart contract developers lack tools to ensure
security. However, there have been many tools for such security
analysis published in recent years. Our results show that although
there are many tools, most of them are not user friendly and are
not used in practice.
This is the only work to date that has conducted a literature
review to collect maintenance issues of smart contracts and used
an online survey to validate these findings with practitioners. Prior
works, e.g., Chakraborty et al. [16] , Bosu et al. [10], use an
online survey to collect answers for their predefined questions.
However, these predefined questions can lead to missing some
points of view. Udokwu et al. [127], Macrinici et al. [128] conduct
literature reviews to collect answers for their predefined research
questions. However, there might be a gap between academia and
industry knowledge, usage, practices and desired outcomes. Also,
the fast growing ecosystem of Ethereum can also create errors for
some even recent findings. Thus, the findings based exclusively on
literature reviews might also not be reliable.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we conducted the first empirical study on the
maintenance issues related to smart contracts on Ethereum. We
performed a systematic literature review to obtain related informa-
tion and used an online survey to validate our findings with prac-
titioners. Our study contains three research questions. In RQ1, we
identified 10 kinds of issues related to corrective, adaptive, perfec-
tive, and preventive maintenance of smart contacts, and another 5
issues corresponding to the overall maintenance process for smart
contracts. In RQ2, we summarized current maintenance methods
used for smart contracts from 41 publications and divided them
into three categories, offline checking methods, online checking
methods, and other methods. In the last RQ, we highlighted two
kinds of future research directions and discussed some suggestions
for both smart contract developers and researchers according to the
previous RQ answers and our survey results.
In the future, Ethereum will add more functionalities, which
may lead to other smart contract maintenance issues. We plan to
identify more maintenance issues when revolutionary functionali-
ties are added, e.g., sharding. We have highlighted several research
directions in RQ3, and we plan to work on some of these topics
ourselves in the future.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008.
[2] (Jan., 2019) Blockchain. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Blockchain
[3] D. Efanov and P. Roschin, “The all-pervasiveness of the blockchain
technology,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 123, pp. 116–121, 2018.
[4] (Jan., 2019) Ethereum.org. [Online]. Available: https://www.ethereum.
org/
18
[5] (Apr., 2019) Decentralized application. [Online]. Available: https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decentralized application
[6] W. Chen, M. Ma, Y. Ye, Z. Zheng, and Y. Zhou, “Iot service based on
jointcloud blockchain: The case study of smart traveling,” in 2018 IEEE
Symposium on service-oriented system engineering (SOSE). IEEE,
2018, pp. 216–221.
[7] (April., 2018) ERC20. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/
ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md
[8] (Feb., 2019) Cryptokitties. [Online]. Available: https://www.
cryptokitties.co/
[9] Y. Velner, J. Teutsch, and L. Luu, “Smart contracts make bitcoin
mining pools vulnerable,” in International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 2017, pp. 298–316.
[10] A. Bosu, A. Iqbal, R. Shahriyar, and P. Chakraborty, “Understanding the
motivations, challenges and needs of blockchain software developers: a
survey,” Empirical Software Engineering, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 2636–2673,
2019.
[11] T. M. Pigoski, Practical software maintenance: best practices for
managing your software investment. Wiley Publishing, 1996.
[12] “Iso/iec/ieee international standard for software engineering - software
life cycle processes - maintenance,” ISO/IEC 14764:2006 (E) IEEE Std
14764-2006 Revision of IEEE Std 1219-1998), pp. 1–58, 2006.
[13] M. Fowler and K. Beck, Refactoring: improving the design of existing
code. Addison-Wesley Professional, 1999.
[14] W. Zou, D. Lo, P. S. Kochhar, X.-B. D. Le, X. Xia, Y. Feng, Z. Chen, and
B. Xu, “Smart contract development: Challenges and opportunities,”
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 2019.
[15] R. M. Parizi, A. Dehghantanha, K.-K. R. Choo, and A. Singh, “Em-
pirical vulnerability analysis of automated smart contracts security
testing on blockchains,” in Proceedings of the 28th Annual International
Conference on Computer Science and Software Engineering. IBM
Corp., 2018, pp. 103–113.
[16] P. Chakraborty, R. Shahriyar, A. Iqbal, and A. Bosu, “Understanding
the software development practices of blockchain projects: a survey,”
in Proceedings of the 12th ACM/IEEE International Symposium on
Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement, 2018, pp. 1–10.
[17] X. Li, P. Jiang, T. Chen, X. Luo, and Q. Wen, “A survey on the security
of blockchain systems,” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2017.
[18] N. He, L. Wu, H. Wang, Y. Guo, and X. Jiang, “Characterizing
code clones in the ethereum smart contract ecosystem,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1905.00272, 2019.
[19] L. Luu, D.-H. Chu, H. Olickel, P. Saxena, and A. Hobor, “Making
smart contracts smarter,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2016,
pp. 254–269.
[20] (Mar., 2020) Solidity Document. [Online]. Available: http://solidity.
readthedocs.io
[21] T. Chen, Y. Zhu, Z. Li, J. Chen, X. Li, X. Luo, X. Lin, and X. Zhange,
“Understanding ethereum via graph analysis,” in IEEE INFOCOM
2018-IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE, 2018,
pp. 1484–1492.
[22] T. Chen, Z. Li, Y. Zhu, J. Chen, X. Luo, J. C.-S. Lui, X. Lin,
and X. Zhang, “Understanding ethereum via graph analysis,” ACM
Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT), vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 1–32,
2020.
[23] (Apr., 2020) Marketcap. [Online]. Available: https://www.ccn.com/
marketcap/
[24] G. Wood, “Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction
ledger,” Project Yellow Paper, 2014.
[25] T. Chen, Z. Li, Y. Zhang, X. Luo, A. Chen, K. Yang, B. Hu, T. Zhu,
S. Deng, T. Hu et al., “Dataether: Data exploration framework for
ethereum,” in 2019 IEEE 39th International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems (ICDCS). IEEE, 2019, pp. 1369–1380.
[26] (Mar., 2020) Vyper document. [Online]. Available: https://vyper.
readthedocs.io
[27] (Mar., 2020) ETH Gas Station. [Online]. Available: https://
ethgasstation.info/
[28] (Mar., 2020) OpenZeppelin Upgradeable Smart Contract
Document. [Online]. Available: https://docs.openzeppelin.com/learn/
upgrading-smart-contracts
[29] B. Boehm and V. R. Basili, “Software defect reduction top 10 list,”
Foundations of empirical software engineering: the legacy of Victor R.
Basili, vol. 426, no. 37, pp. 426–431, 2005.
[30] (Apr., 2018) Understanding The DAO Attack. [Online]. Available:
https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/
[31] (May., 2020) EIP-150 Hard Fork. [On-
line]. Available: https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/10/13/
announcement-imminent-hard-fork-eip150-gas-cost-changes/
[32] (May., 2020) Spurious Dragon Hard Fork. [Online]. Available:
https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/11/18/hard-fork-no-4-spurious-dragon/
[33] F. A. Fontana, M. V. Ma¨ntyla¨, M. Zanoni, and A. Marino, “Comparing
and experimenting machine learning techniques for code smell detec-
tion,” Empirical Software Engineering, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 1143–1191,
2016.
[34] E. Giger, M. D’Ambros, M. Pinzger, and H. C. Gall, “Method-level
bug prediction,” in Proceedings of the 2012 ACM-IEEE International
Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement.
IEEE, 2012, pp. 171–180.
[35] M. Yan, X. Xia, E. Shihab, D. Lo, J. Yin, and X. Yang, “Automating
change-level self-admitted technical debt determination,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Software Engineering, vol. 45, no. 12, pp. 1211–1229, 2018.
[36] B. Kitchenham and S. Charters, “Guidelines for performing systematic
literature reviews in software engineering,” 2007.
[37] M. Conoscenti, A. Vetro, and J. C. De Martin, “Blockchain for the
internet of things: A systematic literature review,” in 2016 IEEE/ACS
13th International Conference of Computer Systems and Applications
(AICCSA). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–6.
[38] S. Segura, G. Fraser, A. B. Sanchez, and A. Ruiz-Corte´s, “A survey
on metamorphic testing,” IEEE Transactions on software engineering,
vol. 42, no. 9, pp. 805–824, 2016.
[39] R. Huang, W. Sun, Y. Xu, H. Chen, D. Towey, and X. Xia, “A survey on
adaptive random testing,” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering,
2019.
[40] D. Spencer, Card sorting: Designing usable categories. Rosenfeld
Media, 2009.
[41] M. Kim, T. Zimmermann, R. DeLine, and A. Begel, “The emerging role
of data scientists on software development teams,” in 2016 IEEE/ACM
38th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE). IEEE,
2016, pp. 96–107.
[42] J. Chen, X. Xia, D. Lo, J. Grundy, D. X. Luo, and T. Chen, “Defining
smart contract defects on ethereum,” IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, 2020.
[43] B. A. Kitchenham and S. L. Pfleeger, “Personal opinion surveys,” in
Guide to advanced empirical software engineering. Springer, 2008,
pp. 63–92.
[44] P. K. Tyagi, “The effects of appeals, anonymity, and feedback on mail
survey response patterns from salespeople,” Journal of the Academy of
Marketing Science, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 235–241, 1989.
[45] D. L. J. G. Jiachi Chen, Xin Xia, “Why do smart contracts self-destruct?
investigating the selfdestruct function on ethereum,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:2005.07908, 2020.
[46] T. Zhang, J. Chen, G. Yang, B. Lee, and X. Luo, “Towards more
accurate severity prediction and fixer recommendation of software
bugs,” Journal of Systems and Software, vol. 117, pp. 166–184, 2016.
[47] C. Liu, H. Liu, Z. Cao, Z. Chen, B. Chen, and B. Roscoe, “Reguard:
finding reentrancy bugs in smart contracts,” in 2018 IEEE/ACM 40th
International Conference on Software Engineering: Companion (ICSE-
Companion). IEEE, 2018, pp. 65–68.
[48] M. Rodler, W. Li, G. O. Karame, and L. Davi, “Sereum: Protecting
existing smart contracts against re-entrancy attacks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1812.05934, 2018.
[49] N. Atzei, M. Bartoletti, and T. Cimoli, “A survey of attacks on ethereum
smart contracts (sok),” in International conference on principles of
security and trust. Springer, 2017, pp. 164–186.
[50] C. F. Torres, M. Steichen et al., “The art of the scam: Demystifying
honeypots in ethereum smart contracts,” in 28th {USENIX} Security
Symposium ({USENIX} Security 19), 2019, pp. 1591–1607.
[51] M. Kajko-Mattsson, S. Forssander, and U. Olsson, “Corrective mainte-
nance maturity model (cm/sup 3/): maintainer’s education and training,”
in Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Software
Engineering. ICSE 2001. IEEE, 2001, pp. 610–619.
[52] Z. Wan, X. Xia, D. Lo, and G. C. Murphy, “How does machine
learning change software development practices?” IEEE Transactions
on Software Engineering, 2019.
[53] Z. Wan, X. Xia, A. E. Hassan, D. Lo, J. Yin, and X. Yang, “Perceptions,
expectations, and challenges in defect prediction,” IEEE Transactions
on Software Engineering, 2018.
[54] R. Norvill, B. B. F. Pontiveros, R. State, I. Awan, and A. Cullen,
“Automated labeling of unknown contracts in ethereum,” in 2017 26th
International Conference on Computer Communication and Networks
(ICCCN). IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[55] I. Nikolic´, A. Kolluri, I. Sergey, P. Saxena, and A. Hobor, “Finding the
greedy, prodigal, and suicidal contracts at scale,” in Proceedings of the
34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. ACM, 2018,
pp. 653–663.
19
[56] S. Tikhomirov, E. Voskresenskaya, I. Ivanitskiy, R. Takhaviev,
E. Marchenko, and Y. Alexandrov, “Smartcheck: Static analysis of
ethereum smart contracts,” in Proceedings of the 1st International
Workshop on Emerging Trends in Software Engineering for Blockchain,
2018, pp. 9–16.
[57] K. Bhargavan, A. Delignat-Lavaud, C. Fournet, A. Gollamudi,
G. Gonthier, N. Kobeissi, N. Kulatova, A. Rastogi, T. Sibut-Pinote,
N. Swamy et al., “Formal verification of smart contracts: Short paper,”
in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Programming Languages
and Analysis for Security, 2016, pp. 91–96.
[58] G. Bigi, A. Bracciali, G. Meacci, and E. Tuosto, “Validation of de-
centralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods,”
in Programming Languages with Applications to Biology and Security.
Springer, 2015, pp. 142–161.
[59] E. Hildenbrandt, M. Saxena, N. Rodrigues, X. Zhu, P. Daian, D. Guth,
B. Moore, D. Park, Y. Zhang, A. Stefanescu et al., “Kevm: A complete
formal semantics of the ethereum virtual machine,” in 2018 IEEE 31st
Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE, 2018, pp.
204–217.
[60] P. Hegedu˝s, “Towards analyzing the complexity landscape of solidity
based ethereum smart contracts,” Technologies, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 6, 2019.
[61] I.-C. Lin and T.-C. Liao, “A survey of blockchain security issues and
challenges.” IJ Network Security, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 653–659, 2017.
[62] Z. Zheng, S. Xie, H.-N. Dai, X. Chen, and H. Wang, “Blockchain
challenges and opportunities: A survey,” International Journal of Web
and Grid Services, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 352–375, 2018.
[63] C. Natoli, J. Yu, V. Gramoli, and P. Esteves-Verissimo, “Deconstructing
blockchains: A comprehensive survey on consensus, membership and
structure,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.08316, 2019.
[64] Z. Zheng, S. Xie, H. Dai, X. Chen, and H. Wang, “An overview of
blockchain technology: Architecture, consensus, and future trends,” in
2017 IEEE international congress on big data (BigData congress).
IEEE, 2017, pp. 557–564.
[65] I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer, “Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is
vulnerable,” in International conference on financial cryptography and
data security. Springer, 2014, pp. 436–454.
[66] (May., 2020) EIP-140. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/
ethereum/EIPs/issues/140
[67] (Apr., 2018) Ethereum classic. [Online]. Available: https:
//ethereumclassic.github.io/
[68] M. Frowis and R. Bohme, “In code we trust? measuring the control flow
immutability of all smart contracts deployed on ethereum,” LNCS, vol.
10436, pp. 357–372, 2017.
[69] M. Lohr and S. Peldszus, “Maintenance of long-living smart contracts,”
CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 2020.
[70] T. Chen, Z. Li, H. Zhou, J. Chen, X. Luo, X. Li, and X. Zhang,
“Towards saving money in using smart contracts,” in 2018 IEEE/ACM
40th International Conference on Software Engineering: New Ideas and
Emerging Technologies Results (ICSE-NIER). IEEE, 2018, pp. 81–84.
[71] T. Chen, Y. Feng, Z. Li, H. Zhou, X. Luo, X. Li, X. Xiao, J. Chen, and
X. Zhang, “Gaschecker: Scalable analysis for discovering gas-inefficient
smart contracts,” IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing,
2020.
[72] N. Grech, M. Kong, A. Jurisevic, L. Brent, B. Scholz, and Y. Smarag-
dakis, “Madmax: Surviving out-of-gas conditions in ethereum smart
contracts,” Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages, vol. 2,
no. OOPSLA, pp. 1–27, 2018.
[73] A. T. Tai and L. Alkalai, “On-board maintenance for long-life systems,”
in Proceedings. 1998 IEEE Workshop on Application-Specific Software
Engineering and Technology. ASSET-98 (Cat. No. 98EX183). IEEE,
1998, pp. 69–74.
[74] T. Zhang, J. Chen, X. Zhan, X. Luo, D. Lo, and H. Jiang,
“Where2change: Change request localization for app reviews,” IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, 2019.
[75] W. Maalej and H. Nabil, “Bug report, feature request, or simply
praise? on automatically classifying app reviews,” in 2015 IEEE 23rd
international requirements engineering conference (RE). IEEE, 2015,
pp. 116–125.
[76] G. Grano, A. Di Sorbo, F. Mercaldo, C. A. Visaggio, G. Canfora, and
S. Panichella, “Android apps and user feedback: a dataset for software
evolution and quality improvement,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM
SIGSOFT International Workshop on App Market Analytics, 2017, pp.
8–11.
[77] L. Kiffer, D. Levin, and A. Mislove, “Analyzing ethereum’s contract
topology,” in Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference
2018, 2018, pp. 494–499.
[78] M. Di Angelo and G. Salzer, “Mayflies, breeders, and busy bees in
ethereum: smart contracts over time,” in Proceedings of the Third ACM
Workshop on Blockchains, Cryptocurrencies and Contracts, 2019, pp.
1–10.
[79] (April., 2020) ERC721. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/
ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-721.md
[80] (April., 2020) The Ethereum Improvement Proposal repository.
[Online]. Available: https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs
[81] C. F. Torres, J. Schu¨tte, and R. State, “Osiris: Hunting for integer bugs in
ethereum smart contracts,” in Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference, 2018, pp. 664–676.
[82] E. Zhou, S. Hua, B. Pi, J. Sun, Y. Nomura, K. Yamashita, and
H. Kurihara, “Security assurance for smart contract,” in 2018 9th IFIP
International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security
(NTMS). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–5.
[83] L. Brent, A. Jurisevic, M. Kong, E. Liu, F. Gauthier, V. Gramoli,
R. Holz, and B. Scholz, “Vandal: A scalable security analysis framework
for smart contracts,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.03981, 2018.
[84] I. Nikolic´, A. Kolluri, I. Sergey, P. Saxena, and A. Hobor, “Finding
the greedy, prodigal, and suicidal contracts at scale,” in Proceedings of
the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2018, pp.
653–663.
[85] J. Chang, B. Gao, H. Xiao, J. Sun, Y. Cai, and Z. Yang, “scompile:
Critical path identification and analysis for smart contracts,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Formal Engineering Methods. Springer, 2019,
pp. 286–304.
[86] J. Krupp and C. Rossow, “teether: Gnawing at ethereum to automati-
cally exploit smart contracts,” in 27th {USENIX} Security Symposium
({USENIX} Security 18), 2018, pp. 1317–1333.
[87] L. Luu, D.-H. Chu, H. Olickel, P. Saxena, and A. Hobor, “Making smart
contracts smarter,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC conference
on computer and communications security, 2016, pp. 254–269.
[88] M. Mossberg, F. Manzano, E. Hennenfent, A. Groce, G. Grieco,
J. Feist, T. Brunson, and A. Dinaburg, “Manticore: A user-friendly
symbolic execution framework for binaries and smart contracts,” in
2019 34th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software
Engineering (ASE). IEEE, 2019, pp. 1186–1189.
[89] T. Chen, Y. Zhang, Z. Li, X. Luo, T. Wang, R. Cao, X. Xiao, and
X. Zhang, “Tokenscope: Automatically detecting inconsistent behaviors
of cryptocurrency tokens in ethereum,” in Proceedings of the 2019 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2019,
pp. 1503–1520.
[90] P. Tsankov, A. Dan, D. Drachsler-Cohen, A. Gervais, F. Buenzli, and
M. Vechev, “Securify: Practical security analysis of smart contracts,” in
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. ACM, 2018, pp. 67–82.
[91] D. Park, Y. Zhang, M. Saxena, P. Daian, and G. Ros¸u, “A formal
verification tool for ethereum vm bytecode,” in Proceedings of the 2018
26th ACM Joint Meeting on European Software Engineering Conference
and Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering, 2018, pp.
912–915.
[92] S. Amani, M. Be´gel, M. Bortin, and M. Staples, “Towards verifying
ethereum smart contract bytecode in isabelle/hol,” in Proceedings of the
7th ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Certified Programs
and Proofs, 2018, pp. 66–77.
[93] S. Kalra, S. Goel, M. Dhawan, and S. Sharma, “Zeus: Analyzing safety
of smart contracts.” in NDSS, 2018, pp. 1–12.
[94] B. Jiang, Y. Liu, and W. Chan, “Contractfuzzer: Fuzzing smart contracts
for vulnerability detection,” in Proceedings of the 33rd ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, 2018,
pp. 259–269.
[95] Y. Fu, M. Ren, F. Ma, Y. Jiang, H. Shi, and J. Sun, “Evmfuzz:
Differential fuzz testing of ethereum virtual machine,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1903.08483, 2019.
[96] T. D. Nguyen, L. H. Pham, J. Sun, Y. Lin, and Q. T. Minh, “sfuzz: An
efficient adaptive fuzzer for solidity smart contracts,” ICSE, 2020.
[97] A. Kolluri, I. Nikolic, I. Sergey, A. Hobor, and P. Saxena, “Exploiting
the laws of order in smart contracts,” in Proceedings of the 28th ACM
SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis,
2019, pp. 363–373.
[98] H. Liu, C. Liu, W. Zhao, Y. Jiang, and J. Sun, “S-gram: towards
semantic-aware security auditing for ethereum smart contracts,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 33rd ACM/IEEE International Conference on Automated
Software Engineering, 2018, pp. 814–819.
[99] T. H.-D. Huang, “Hunting the ethereum smart contract: Color-inspired
inspection of potential attacks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.01868, 2018.
[100] A. Tann, X. J. Han, S. S. Gupta, and Y.-S. Ong, “Towards safer smart
contracts: A sequence learning approach to detecting vulnerabilities,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.06632, pp. 1371–1385, 2018.
20
[101] Z. Gao, L. Jiang, X. Xia, D. Lo, and J. Grundy, “Checking smart con-
tracts with structural code embedding,” IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, 2020.
[102] A. Mavridou and A. Laszka, “Designing secure ethereum smart con-
tracts: A finite state machine based approach,” in International Confer-
ence on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 2018,
pp. 523–540.
[103] Z. Li, H. Wu, J. Xu, X. Wang, L. Zhang, and Z. Chen, “Musc: A tool for
mutation testing of ethereum smart contract,” in 2019 34th IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE).
IEEE, 2019, pp. 1198–1201.
[104] G. Ayoade, E. Bauman, L. Khan, and K. Hamlen, “Smart contract
defense through bytecode rewriting,” in 2019 IEEE International Con-
ference on Blockchain (Blockchain). IEEE, 2019, pp. 384–389.
[105] S. Azzopardi, J. Ellul, and G. J. Pace, “Monitoring smart contracts:
Contractlarva and open challenges beyond,” in International Conference
on Runtime Verification. Springer, 2018, pp. 113–137.
[106] F. Zhang, E. Cecchetti, K. Croman, A. Juels, and E. Shi, “Town crier: An
authenticated data feed for smart contracts,” in Proceedings of the 2016
aCM sIGSAC conference on computer and communications security,
2016, pp. 270–282.
[107] Z. Wang, W. Dai, K.-K. R. Choo, H. Jin, and D. Zou, “Fsfc: An input
filter-based secure framework for smart contract,” Journal of Network
and Computer Applications, p. 102530, 2020.
[108] C. Ferreira Torres, M. Baden, R. Norvill, and H. Jonker, “Ægis: Smart
shielding of smart contracts,” in Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2019, pp.
2589–2591.
[109] H. Wang, Y. Li, S.-W. Lin, L. Ma, and Y. Liu, “Vultron: catching
vulnerable smart contracts once and for all,” in 2019 IEEE/ACM 41st
International Conference on Software Engineering: New Ideas and
Emerging Results (ICSE-NIER). IEEE, 2019, pp. 1–4.
[110] X. Wang, J. He, Z. Xie, G. Zhao, and S.-C. Cheung, “Contractguard:
Defend ethereum smart contracts with embedded intrusion detection,”
IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 2019.
[111] (Mar., 2020) Abstract syntax tree. [Online]. Available: https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract syntax tree
[112] (Mar., 2020) Formal verification. [Online]. Available: https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal verification
[113] N. Swamy, C. Hrit¸cu, C. Keller, A. Rastogi, A. Delignat-Lavaud,
S. Forest, K. Bhargavan, C. Fournet, P.-Y. Strub, M. Kohlweiss et al.,
“Dependent types and multi-monadic effects in f,” in Proceedings of
the 43rd Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of
Programming Languages, 2016, pp. 256–270.
[114] T. Nipkow, L. C. Paulson, and M. Wenzel, Isabelle/HOL: a proof
assistant for higher-order logic. Springer Science & Business Media,
2002, vol. 2283.
[115] S. Kalra, S. Goel, M. Dhawan, and S. Sharma, “Zeus: Analyzing safety
of smart contracts,” in 25th Annual Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (NDSS18), 2018.
[116] V. Costan and S. Devadas, “Intel sgx explained.” IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, vol. 2016, no. 086, pp. 1–118, 2016.
[117] (Feb., 2015) Intel Corporation. Intel Software Guard Extensions
Evaluation SDK Users Guide for Windows* OS. [Online]. Available:
https://software.intel.com/sites/products/sgx-sdk-users-guide-windows
[118] C. Colombo, J. Ellul, and G. J. Pace, “Contracts over smart contracts:
Recovering from violations dynamically,” in International Symposium
on Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods. Springer, 2018, pp.
300–315.
[119] B. Marino and A. Juels, “Setting standards for altering and undoing
smart contracts,” in International Symposium on Rules and Rule Markup
Languages for the Semantic Web. Springer, 2016, pp. 151–166.
[120] (Feb., 2020) Ppenzepplelin Contracts. [Online]. Available: https:
//github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts
[121] (Feb., 2020) Smart Contract Best Practices. [Online]. Available:
https://github.com/ConsenSys/smart-contract-best-practices
[122] J. Bruce, “The mini-blockchain scheme,” White paper, 2014.
[123] (Sept., 2019) Pos: Proof of stake. [Online]. Available: https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof of stake
[124] (Sept., 2019) Delegated proof of stake. [On-
line]. Available: https://lisk.io/academy/blockchain-basics/
how-does-blockchain-work/delegated-proof-of-stake
[125] (Jun., 2020) Releases of Solidity. [Online]. Available: https:
//github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases
[126] A. D. Ong and D. J. Weiss, “The impact of anonymity on responses to
sensitive questions 1,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, vol. 30,
no. 8, pp. 1691–1708, 2000.
[127] C. Udokwu, A. Kormiltsyn, K. Thangalimodzi, and A. Norta, “The
state of the art for blockchain-enabled smart-contract applications in
the organization,” in 2018 Ivannikov Ispras Open Conference (ISPRAS).
IEEE, 2018, pp. 137–144.
[128] D. Macrinici, C. Cartofeanu, and S. Gao, “Smart contract applications
within blockchain technology: A systematic mapping study,” Telematics
and Informatics, vol. 35, no. 8, pp. 2337–2354, 2018.
[129] X. Li, P. Jiang, T. Chen, X. Luo, and Q. Wen, “A survey on the security
of blockchain systems,” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2017.
[130] M. Bartoletti, S. Carta, T. Cimoli, and R. Saia, “Dissecting ponzi
schemes on ethereum: identification, analysis, and impact,” Future
Generation Computer Systems, vol. 102, pp. 259–277, 2020.
[131] J. C. E. N. P. Z. Weili Chen, Zibin Zheng and Y. Zhou, “Detecting
ponzi schemes on ethereum: Towards healthier blockchain technology,”
in Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference on World Wide
Web. International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee,
2018, pp. 1409–1418.
[132] W. Chen, Z. Zheng, E. C.-H. Ngai, P. Zheng, and Y. Zhou, “Exploiting
blockchain data to detect smart ponzi schemes on ethereum,” IEEE
Access, vol. 7, pp. 37 575–37 586, 2019.
[133] K. Delmolino, M. Arnett, A. Kosba, A. Miller, and E. Shi, “Step
by step towards creating a safe smart contract: Lessons and insights
from a cryptocurrency lab,” in International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 2016, pp. 79–94.
[134] Z. Zheng, S. Xie, H.-N. Dai, W. Chen, X. Chen, J. Weng, and M. Imran,
“An overview on smart contracts: Challenges, advances and platforms,”
Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. 105, pp. 475–491, 2020.
[135] A. Reyna, C. Martı´n, J. Chen, E. Soler, and M. Dı´az, “On blockchain
and its integration with iot. challenges and opportunities,” Future
generation computer systems, vol. 88, pp. 173–190, 2018.
[136] B. K. Mohanta, S. S. Panda, and D. Jena, “An overview of smart contract
and use cases in blockchain technology,” in 2018 9th International Con-
ference on Computing, Communication and Networking Technologies
(ICCCNT). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–4.
[137] D. Perez and B. Livshits, “Smart contract vulnerabilities: Does anyone
care?” arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.06710, 2019.
[138] D. Harz and W. Knottenbelt, “Towards safer smart contracts:
A survey of languages and verification methods,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1809.0980, 2018.
[139] F. Schrans, S. Eisenbach, and S. Drossopoulou, “Writing safe smart
contracts in flint,” in Conference Companion of the 2nd International
Conference on Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming, 2018,
pp. 218–219.
[140] R. M. Parizi, A. Dehghantanha et al., “Smart contract programming
languages on blockchains: An empirical evaluation of usability and
security,” in International Conference on Blockchain. Springer, 2018,
pp. 75–91.
[141] M. Vukolic´, “Rethinking permissioned blockchains,” in Proceedings of
the ACM Workshop on Blockchain, Cryptocurrencies and Contracts,
2017, pp. 3–7.
[142] M. Bartoletti and L. Pompianu, “An empirical analysis of smart con-
tracts: platforms, applications, and design patterns,” in International
conference on financial cryptography and data security. Springer,
2017, pp. 494–509.
[143] S. Bistarelli, G. Mazzante, M. Micheletti, L. Mostarda, and F. Tiezzi,
“Analysis of ethereum smart contracts and opcodes,” in International
Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications.
Springer, 2019, pp. 546–558.
